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This Article takes a critical look at the major changes brought about 
by recent amendments to the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 
(IRFA). The first section briefly traces IRFA’s key features and operation 
since its enactment, including an overview of the statute’s institutions and 
reporting and sanctioning mechanisms. This section also highlights the 
ongoing debate regarding IRFA’s legitimacy and offers a summary of the 
major criticisms leveled against the statute, as well as the responses raised 
in its defense. With this background in place, the Article turns to an analysis 
of the legislative history surrounding the Frank R. Wolf International 
Religious Freedom Act (Wolf Act) between 2015 and 2016. This bipartisan 
legislative initiative envisioned a wide range of amendments intended to 
address some of IRFA’s past shortcomings. Among the changes initially put 
forward, IRFA’s narrow focus on states would be expanded to include violent 
nonstate actors responsible for violating freedom of religion or belief. In 
addition, the original Wolf Act called for boosting the responsibilities and 
profile of IRFA’s institutional actors, increasing funding for the promotion 
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of international religious freedom activities, mandatory religious freedom 
training of State Department officials, and a significant reduction of exec-
utive discretion. As a review of this legislative history will demonstrate, 
however, many of the changes originally proposed would be either diluted or 
altogether deleted, the victims of bad design or competing political interests. 
The final content of the Wolf Act as enacted represents an ambivalent renewal 
of IRFA’s original promise “to use and implement appropriate tools in the 
United States foreign policy apparatus . . . to promote respect for religious 
freedom by all governments and peoples.”1 In conclusion, the Article posits 
some of this ambivalence may be alleviated or partially remedied based on 
how IRFA’s primary institutional actors turn to the task of implementation. 
At the same time, securing a more definitive assertion of the central role of 
religious freedom in U.S. foreign policy as envisioned in the original Wolf 
Act will likely require a renewed, more concerted and committed second 
effort by Congress. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
As one of his final acts as president, Barack Obama authorized the first 
major overhaul of the International Religious Freedom Act (hereinafter 
“IRFA”) since its passage twenty years ago.2 This Article will take a critical 
look at the major changes brought about by this overhaul and argue they fail to 
fully deliver on the objectives attached to the original effort to amend IRFA. 
																																								 																				
1 International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-292, §2(b)(5), 112 Stat. 
2787, 2790 (1998) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6401). 
2 Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 114-281, 130 Stat. 1426, 
1426 (2016) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6401). 
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Part One of this Article briefly introduces IRFA’s key features and 
operation prior to the 2016 amendments, including an overview of the 
institutions and reporting and sanctioning system created by the statute. This 
section will also highlight the debate over IRFA’s legitimacy and trace the 
major criticisms leveled against the statute since its inception, as well as the 
responses raised in its defense.  
With this background in place, Part Two will review the legislative 
history surrounding the Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act 
(hereinafter “Wolf Act”) between 2015-2016.3 This bipartisan legislative 
initiative envisioned a wide range of amendments intended to strengthen IRFA 
and respond to past shortcomings. Among the changes initially put forward, 
IRFA would move beyond its narrow focus on states to include scrutiny of 
violent nonstate actors responsible for violating freedom of religion or belief. In 
addition, the original Wolf Act called for the appointment of a religious freedom 
czar within the National Security Council, a significant boost to the profile and 
standing of the Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom, and 
guaranteed minimum funding and staffing for the Office of International 
Religious Freedom and for programs intended to promote international religious 
freedom. Further, the bill included mandatory religious freedom training of State 
Department officials and a significant reduction in executive discretion, includ-
ing a new tier system that would authorize automatic designation of certain 
countries as Countries of Particular Concern. As this legislative history will 
demonstrate, many of the proposed changes would go on to be diluted or 
altogether deleted, the victims of bad design or competing political interests. 
In assessing the final content of the Wolf Act amendments to IRFA, 
this Article takes a middle ground. The changes authorized by Congress afford 
IRFA some long-needed basic upgrades and updates. However, many of the 
more innovative and forceful original proposals proved too overbroad or 
simply too bold to successfully navigate the negotiation process. Ultimately, 
what remains of the amendments represents an ambivalent renewal of IRFA’s 
original promise “to use and implement appropriate tools in the United States 
foreign policy apparatus . . . to promote respect for religious freedom by all 
governments and peoples.”4 Some of this ambivalence may be alleviated or 
partially remedied by how IRFA’s primary institutional actors opt to imple-
ment the various amendments. At the same time, securing a more definitive 
assertion of the central role of religious freedom in U.S. foreign policy as 
envisioned in the original Wolf Act may require a more concerted and 
committed second effort by Congress. 
																																								 																				
3 Named for the now-retired sponsor of the original 1998 legislation, Rep. Frank Wolf (R-VA).  
4 International Religious Freedom Act §2(b)(5), 112 Stat. at 2790 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 
6401). 
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I. TWENTY YEARS OF IRFA: BRICKBATS AND BOUQUETS 
 
For two decades, monitoring and reporting on international violations 
of freedom of thought, conscience and religion or belief has been a formalized 
component of the foreign policy of the United States government. This 
phenomenon can be traced back to bipartisan passage of the IRFA,5 which 
President Bill Clinton signed into law in 1998. Among other things, IRFA 
created new institutional actors dedicated to collecting data and advising the 
U.S. government on violations of religious freedom in foreign countries. These 
actors included an Office on International Religious Freedom (OIRF) and 
Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom within the 
Department of State, an independent, bipartisan Commission on International 
Religious Freedom (USCIRF), and a Special Adviser on International Religious 
Freedom within the National Security Council.6 
With these new institutions in place, IRFA mandated that OIRF prepare 
an annual report containing “detailed information with respect to matters 
involving international religious freedom”7 in every foreign country, including:  
 
• The status of religious freedom; 
• An “assessment and description of the nature and extent 
of violations of religious freedom”; 
• A “description of United States actions and policies in 
support of religious freedom in each foreign country enga-
ging in or tolerating violations of religious freedom”; and 
• “A description of any binding agreement with a foreign 
government entered into by the United States.”8 
 
To undertake this global reporting obligation, IRFA further required 
that U.S. missions standardize reporting and “thoroughly investigate reports of 
violations of the internationally recognized right to freedom of religion.”9 This 
																																								 																				
5 See generally, id. The bill passed in the Senate 98-0. Originally introduced in the House of 
Representatives as an Act “to establish an Office of Religious Persecution Monitoring.” 
Freedom from Religious Persecution Act of 1997, H.R. 2431, 105th Cong. (1997). 
6 According to USCIRF, “no administration since [IRFA’s] enactment has named an adviser 
focusing only on international religious freedom; instead, all have assigned the issue to an 
NSC director as part of a broader human rights and multilateral affairs portfolio.” U.S. 
COMM. ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, ANN. REP. 11 (2017). 
7 International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-292, §102, 112 Stat. 2787, 
2793 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6412).  
8 Id.  
9 Id. at 2794. 
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point is critical inasmuch as it signaled Congress’ intention to measure violations 
of freedom of religion and belief not based on the yardstick of U.S. law, but 
rather as articulated under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).10 
  Where this reporting reveals a foreign government has engaged in or 
tolerated violations of religious freedom, IRFA requires that the president take 
action.11 Title IV of IRFA provides the president with a variety of measures 
intended to “respond to the nature and severity of the violations of religious 
freedom”12 at issue, with an eye towards securing the “cessation of such vio-
lations.”13 In the case of governments identified as violating religious freedom, 
the statute provides the president with access to 15 specific actions, ranging 
from “soft” actions, such as “private demarche” and “the delay or cancellation 
of working, official, or state visits,” to more pointed steps including prohibiting 
U.S. procurement from and loans to the targeted government.14 As an altern-
ative to these specific actions, IRFA grants the president the open-ended ability 
to take commensurate action or to “negotiate and enter into a binding agree-
ment” with the government responsible for violations of religious freedom.15 
Where the president concludes that a government’s action escalates 
into engaging in or tolerating “particularly severe violations of religious 
freedom”, IRFA requires that the country at issue be designated as a “country 
of particular concern” (CPC) for religious freedom.16 This designation takes 
																																								 																				
10 Id. at §2(a)(5), 2788 (codified at 22 U.S.C. 6401). Violations under IRFA include “arbitrary 
prohibitions on, restrictions of, or punishment for” peaceful religious assembly; expressions of 
religious belief; changing one’s religious beliefs; possession and distribution of religious 
literature; raising children according to the religious practices of one’s choosing; or “detention, 
interrogation, imposition of an onerous financial penalty, forced labor, forced mass resettlement, 
imprisonment, forced religious conversion, beating, torture, mutilation, rape, enslavement, 
murder, and execution” committed on the basis of an individual’s religion or belief. Id. at §3(13), 
2791 (codified at 22 U.S.C. 6401). 
11 In 1999, President Clinton delegated this responsibility to the Secretary of State. See 
Delegation of Responsibilities Under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 64 
Fed. Reg. 47345 (Aug. 17, 1999).  
12 International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-292, § 401, 112 Stat. 2787, 
2801 (1998) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6441).  
13 Id. at 2801–2802.  
14 Id. at § 405, 2806–07 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6445). 
15 Id. at 2807. 
16 Under the statute, “particular severe violations” means:  
 
“[S]ystematic, ongoing, egregious violations of religious freedom, 
including violations such as— 
(A) torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment;  
(B) prolonged detention without charges;  
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IRFA’s “soft” responses off the table. Instead, it commits the president to more 
forceful action, ranging from the withdrawal, limitation, or suspension of 
United States development assistance and security assistance to prohibiting 
U.S. procurement from and loans to the targeted government.17 In these 
“particularly severe” cases, the president may still opt for commensurate action 
or a binding agreement with the violating government.18 At the same time, 
IRFA also provides the president with the ability to waive any action on 
designated CPCs where such a waiver would further the purposes of IRFA or 
be in “the important national interest of the United States.”19  
As illustrated in the table below, action taken in accordance with IRFA 
has resulted in the president either authorizing sanctions on certain CPCs or 
issuing multi-year waivers intended to further the purposes of IRFA or U.S. 
national interest. In imposing sanctions on designated CPCs, however, the 
president has virtually never opted to authorize new, IRFA-based sanctions. In 
2005, the State Department denied export of defense articles and services 
covered under the Arms Export Control Act to Eritrea. According to USCIRF, 
“This was the first, and so far only, unique presidential action under (IRFA) in 
response to a CPC designation.”20 Instead, past practice typically has resulted 
in ordering preexisting sanctions already in place against a country (for reasons 
unrelated to CPC designation under IRFA) to be “double hatted”, and therefore 
also to reflect the penalty required under IRFA. 
The table below also confirms that only 14 countries of the nearly 200 
reviewed annually by the OIRF have ever been designated as CPCs. Addi-
tionally, the identity of these CPCs has remained relatively static over IRFA’s 
lifetime, with most of them now chronic fixtures on the annually revised CPC 
list. Of the current ten CPC-designated countries, Burma, China, Iran and 
Sudan can all be traced back to the original list issued in 1999. Another four 
countries—Eritrea, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, and Uzbekistan—were added 
early in the last decade. Only two countries—Tajikistan and Turkmenistan—
recently joined the CPC list in 2014 and 2016 respectively. 
																																								 																				
(C) causing the disappearance of persons by the abduction or clandestine  
     rdetention of those persons; or  
(D) other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, or the security of persons.”  
 
Id. at 2791 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6402).  
17 International Religious Freedom Act § 405, 112 Stat. at 2807 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6445).  
18 Id.  
19 Id. at 2808 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6445). 
20 U.S. COMM. ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, ANN. REP. 47 (2010). 
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Beyond the ten current CPC designations, only four additional 
countries—Iraq under Saddam Hussain, Afghanistan under the Taliban, the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia) under Slobodan Milošević, and 
Vietnam—have made formal, if short-lived, appearances on the list. The 
State Department removed the first three designations following military 
interventions and ensuing regime changes. In the case of Vietnam, after a 
short two-year stint on the CPC list, the U.S. Department of State heralded 
improvements derived from a secretly-negotiated binding agreement with the 
Vietnamese government as a sufficient basis for delisting that country.21 The 
State Department has not added a new country to the CPC list since 2016. 
In contrast with State Department practice, the U.S. Commission on 
International Religious Freedom’s (USCIRF) CPC recommendations divulge 
a far wider variation in the number and identity of states persistently violating 
religious freedom. For example, USCIRF’s most recent annual report 
endorsed the State Department’s ten CPCs and called for six additional states 
to be added to the list: Central African Republic, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, 
Syria, and Vietnam.22 Further to this, the Commission has introduced and 
maintains its own “Tier 2” listing of countries. According to USCIRF, Tier 2 
countries do not rise to the CPC level, but nevertheless have governments 
identified as engaging in or tolerating serious violations “characterized by  
at least one of the elements of the ‘systematic, ongoing, and egregious’ CPC 
standard.”23 In 2018, the Commission included 12 countries within this  
Tier 2 designation.24  
From USCIRF’s perspective, “Over time, the disparities between 
USCIRF’s CPC recommendations and the State Department’s CPC 
designations have grown, with USCIRF consistently recommending more 
countries than the secretary designates.”25 However, IRFA does not make 
																																								 																				
21 According to USCIRF, “Vietnam is unique in that it is the only [country] removed from the 
CPC list due to diplomatic activity.” U.S. COMM. ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM IN VIETNAM: ASSESSING THE COUNTRY OF PARTICULAR CONCERN DESIGNATION 10 
YEARS AFTER ITS REMOVAL, 1 (2017) [hereinafter U.S. COMM. ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, 
10 YEARS AFTER]. Moreover, Vietnam is also the only “known use of a binding agreement 
pursuant to a CPC designation under IRFA.” Id. at 3. See also Press Release, U.S. Comm. On 
Int’l Religious Freedom, Vietnam: USCIRF calls on the State Department to make “secret” May 
5 agreement with Vietnam public (Jun. 22, 2005), https://www.uscirf.gov/news-room/press-re 
leases/vietnam-uscirf-calls-the-state-department-make-secret-may-5-agreement [https://perma.c 
c/5GU8-3TGU]. 
22 U.S. COMM. ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, ANN. REP. 3 (2018). 
23 Id.  
24 Id. (“Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Cuba, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Kazakhstan, 
Laos, Malaysia, and Turkey.”). 
25 U.S. COMM. ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, 10 YEARS AFTER supra note 21 at 2.  
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USCIRF’s views binding upon the president. Rather, the statute requires only 
that the president “take into account any findings or recommendations by the 
Commission” in making CPC designations.26  
 
Table: CPC Designations and Sanctions Action, By Country 1999-201727 
[Countries designated by shading are under CPC sanction waivers] 
 
Country Years Designated Sanction Action 
Burma 1999-
present 
Existing ongoing [arms embargo] restrict-
ions in 22 CFR 126.128 
 
China  
 
1999-
present 
Existing ongoing restriction on exports to 
China of crime control and detection instru-
ments and equipment, under the Foreign 
Relations Authorization Act of 1990 and 
1991 (Pub. L. 101-246) 
 
Eritrea 2004-
present 
Ongoing [arms embargo] restrictions in 22 
CFR 126.29 
 
Iran30 
 
1999-
present 
Existing ongoing travel restrictions in 
section 221(c) of the Iran Threat Reduction 
and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (TRA) 
for individuals identified under section 
																																								 																				
26 International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-292, § 402, 112 Stat. 2787, 
2802 (1998) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6442). 
27 For sanctions reporting, see Secretary of State’s Determination Under the International 
Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 83 Fed. Reg. 1451, 1452 (Jan. 11, 2018); 81 Fed. Reg. 87997, 
87997 (Dec. 6, 2016); 81 Fed. Reg. 23344, 23345 (Apr. 20, 2016); 79 Fed. Reg. 57171, 57172 
(Sep. 24, 2014); 77 Fed. Reg. 20687, 20688 (Apr. 5, 2012); 74 Fed. Reg. 21843 (May 11, 2009). 
28 “In 2005 the Secretary continued the designation of a sanction, consisting of a prohibition on 
exports or other transfers of defense articles and defense services pursuant to the Arms Export 
Control Act . . .” 2006 Executive Summary: International Religious Freedom Report 2006, U.S. 
DEPT. OF STATE, https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2006/71284.htm [https://perma.cc/RC7A-
82SP] (last visited Nov. 20, 2018).  
29 The imposition of sanctions against Eritrea “was the first, and . . . only, unique presidential 
action under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA) in response to a CPC 
designation.” U.S. COMM. ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, ANN. REP. 47 (2010). 
30 “The United States has no diplomatic relations with [Iran] and thus cannot raise directly the 
restrictions the Government places on religious freedom and other abuses that it commits against 
adherents of minority religions.” 2005 Executive Summary: International Religious Freedom 
Report 2005, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2005/51386.htm [https:// 
perma.cc/3SEJ-SWAV] (last visited Nov. 20, 2018).   
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Country Years Designated Sanction Action 
221(a)(1)(C) of the TRA in connection with 
the commission of serious human rights 
abuses.31 
 
Democratic 
People’s 
Republic of 
Korea32 
 
2003-
present 
Existing ongoing restrictions pursuant to 
sections 402 and 409 of the Trade Act of 
1974 (the Jackson-Vanik Amendment)   
Saudi Arabia 2004-
present 
Waiver as required in the “important nation-
al interest of the United States”33 
 
																																								 																				
31 The existing sanctions invoked to double-hat Iran’s CPC status have varied over time. For 
example, in lieu of new IRFA-based sanctions against Iran, in 2012 the State Department 
applied “the existing ongoing restrictions on certain imports from and exports to Iran, in 
accordance with section 103(b) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and 
Divestment Act of 2010 (Pub. L. 111-195).” Secretary of State’s Determination Under the 
International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 77 Fed. Reg. 20687–20688 (Apr. 5, 2012). 
And in 2009: “For Iran, the existing ongoing restrictions on United States security assistance 
in accordance with section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act . . . .” Secretary of State's 
Determination Under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 74 Fed. Reg. 21843 
(May. 11, 2009).  
32 “The U.S. government does not have diplomatic relations with the country. The United 
States cosponsored resolutions at the UN General Assembly and Human Rights Council 
condemning the government’s systematic, widespread, and gross human rights violations.” 
U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK) 2017 INTER-
NATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT 1 (2017).  
33 The State Department has used this language since 2014. Secretary of State’s 
Determination Under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 79 Fed. Reg. 57171, 
57172 (Sept. 24, 2014). The basis for the waiver has fluctuated over time. Until 2012, the 
Secretary invoked a “waiver ‘to further the purposes of the act.’” Secretary of State’s 
Determination Under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 77 Fed. Reg. 20687–
20688 (Apr. 5, 2012). In 2008, the State Department reported “because of new policies 
confirmed by the Saudi Arabian Government, the Secretary renewed a waiver of sanctions 
‘to further the purposes of the Act.’” Executive Summary: International Religious Freedom 
Report 2008, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2008/108351.htm 
[https://perma.cc/VP6A-QQ6X] (last visited Nov. 20, 2018). Similarly, in 2006, the State 
Department “identif[ied] and confirm[ed] a number of key policies that the [Saudi] 
[g]overnment is pursuing and will continue to pursue for the purposes of promoting greater 
freedom for religious practice and increased tolerance for religious groups . . . .” In view of 
these developments, the Secretary issued a waiver of sanctions “to further the purposes of 
the Act.” U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, SAUDI ARABIA: INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
REPORT 2006 15 (2006). 
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Country Years Designated Sanction Action 
Sudan 1999-
present 
Restriction in the annual Department of 
State, Foreign Operations, and Related 
Programs Appropriations Act on making 
certain appropriated funds available for 
assistance to the Government of Sudan, 
currently set forth in section 7042(j) of the 
Department of State, Foreign Operations, 
and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 
2015 (Div. K, Pub. L. 114-113), and any 
provision of law that is the same or 
substantially the same as this provision.34 
 
Tajikistan 2016-
present 
Waiver as required in the “important 
national interest of the United States” 
 
Turkmenistan 2014-
present 
Waiver as required in the “important 
national interest of the United States” 
 
Uzbekistan 2006-
present 
Waiver as required in the “important 
national interest of the United States”35 
 
Vietnam 2004-
200636 
On May 5, 2005, the United States and 
Vietnam concluded an agreement that 
addresses a number of important religious 
freedom concerns. Under the agreement, 
																																								 																				
34 Sanctions double-hatted for Sudan’s CPC designation have varied slightly over time. See, 
e.g., Secretary of State’s Determination Under the International Religious Freedom Act of 
1998, 81 Fed. Reg. 23344–23345 (Apr. 20, 2016); Secretary of State’s Determination Under 
the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 77 Fed. Reg. 20687–20688 (Apr. 5, 2012). 
In 2009, the State Department’s double-hatted CPC sanction used “the voice and vote of the 
United States to oppose any loan or other use of the funds of international financial institutions 
to or for Sudan, consistent with section 1621 of the International Financial Institutions Act.” 
Secretary of State’s Determination Under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 74 
Fed. Reg. 21843 (May. 11, 2009).  
35 Previously, the State Department invoked its waiver to “further the purposes of the Act.” 
77 Fed. Reg. 20687–20688 (Apr. 5, 2012). See also Executive Summary, International 
Religious Freedom Report 2009, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/20 
09/127215.htm [https://perma.cc/LWE2-LKY4]. 
36 In November 2006, the State Department formally removed Vietnam’s CPC designation. 
“[O]n December 29, 2006, the United States granted Vietnam Permanent Normal Trade 
Relations (PNTR) status, paving the way for Vietnam to join the WTO on January 11, 2007.” 
U.S. COMM. ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, 10 YEARS AFTER supra note 21 at 4. 
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Country Years Designated Sanction Action 
Vietnam made a number of commitments 
including: “to fully implement the new laws 
on religious activities and to render previous 
contradictory regulations obsolete, to instruct 
local authorities to adhere strictly and com-
pletely to the new legislation and ensure their 
compliance.” This binding agreement enabled 
Vietnam to avoid “sanctions or another ‘com-
mensurate action’ associated with CPC desig-
nations under IRFA.”37 
Iraq38 1999-2004 CPC status removed in June 2004.39 
Afghanistan/ 
Taliban 
Regime 
1999-2003 Identified “as a matter of policy . . . as a ‘parti-
cularly severe violator’ of religious freedom, 
though it cannot be designated as a ‘country of 
particular concern’ because it is not a govern-
ment recognized by the United States.”40 
Serbia/ 
Milosevic 
Regime 
1999-2001 Designated Serbia under the Milosevic 
regime as a ‘country of particular concern.’ 41 
																																								 																				
37 Id. at 2–3. From USCIRF’s perspective, “Vietnam’s brief placement on the CPC list demon-
strated that the pairing of the CPC designation with the binding agreement worked to foster high-
level cooperation between the United States and Vietnam, even if not to solidify lasting religious 
freedom improvements.” Id. at 5. 
38 “Prior to the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime, the United States had no diplomatic relations 
with Iraq and thus was unable to raise directly with the Government the problems of severe 
restrictions on religious freedom and other human rights abuses. However, the U.S. Government 
made its position clear in public statements and in diplomatic contacts with other states.” Iraq: 
International Religious Freedom Report 2003, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, https://www.state.gov/j/drl/ 
rls/irf/2003/24452.htm [https://perma.cc/3MRS-WJWY] (last visited Jan. 7, 2019).  
39 The 2004 IRF Report contained no Iraq chapter due to the U.S. occupation of that country. 
According to the State Department, “we do not report on our own governance but welcome the 
scrutiny of other responsible reporters. The reporting period end[ed] on June 30, which roughly 
coincide[d] with the date of the transfer of power from the Coalition Provisional Authority to the 
Iraqi Interim Government. In June, the Secretary acted to remove Iraq’s designation as a ‘Country 
of Particular Concern’ for its severe violations of religious freedom under the regime of Saddam 
Hussein. Executive Summary: International Religious Freedom Report 2004, U.S. DEPT. OF 
STATE, https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2004/35335.htm [https://perma.cc/N6DS-XNDH] (last 
visited Nov. 20, 2018). 
40 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, ANN. REP. ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 2001 xxix (2001).  
41 “This designation was lifted in January 2001 after Vojislav Kostunica was elected president.” 
Id. at xxxiii. 
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Beyond USCIRF’s critique that CPC designations have been too few 
and too static, IRFA more generally has been subject to criticism from a 
variety of sources and from the moment of its conception.42 As Rep. Chris 
Smith has described it: “frankly [IRFA] was a very tough sell. There were 
people in the administration and Congress who opposed it. But there was a 
broad coalition that came together to support the bill, bipartisan, ecumenical 
and inclusive of foreign policy experts that made the difference.”43  
Affirming this residual opposition, President Bill Clinton attached a 
lengthy statement to his signature of the IRFA bill. Clinton expressed concern 
that the imposition of economic penalties against states violating religious 
freedom “could result in even greater pressures—and possibly reprisals—
against minority religious communities that the bill is intended to help.”44 He 
also stressed that such measures would only be applicable in extreme situations 
where CPC status is triggered, and even then, the president preserved the ability 
to waive such action where it “would further the purpose of the Act, or if 
required by important national interests.”45 More critically, Clinton regretted 
those provisions that in his view “lack[ed] this flexibility and infringe on the 
authority vested by the Constitution solely with the President.”46 As an 
example, Clinton rejected Congress’ attempt to “direct . . . the president to 
undertake negotiations with foreign governments for specified foreign policy 
purposes” or to brief Congress “concerning these negotiations” as impeding 
the president’s “constitutional responsibilities to conduct foreign affairs.”47   
A consultation held soon after IRFA’s passage that brought government 
officials, human rights professionals, representatives of religious organizations, 
scholars, and others together is telling of the statute’s touchy origins and 
uncertain future. The editors of this meeting’s proceedings described IRFA’s 
congressional authors as proud of “crafting a piece of legislation that balanced 
																																								 																				
42 For insight into the administration’s criticisms of an early iteration of IRFA, see The 
International Religious Freedom Act of 1998: Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
105th Cong. (1998) (statement of John Shattuck, Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, 
Human Rights and Labor) (listing five main concerns, including IRFA’s creation of new 
institutions and the requirement that the president impose executive actions or economic sanctions 
against violators). 
43 Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act of 2015; and Calling for the Release of 
Ukrainian Fighter Pilot Nadiya Savechenko: Markup Before the H. Subcomm. on Africa, Global 
Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations of the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs 114th Cong. 50 (2015). 
44 William J. Clinton, Statement on Signing the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 
AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Oct. 27, 1998), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=55155. 
45 Id.  
46 Id.  
47 Id. 
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the bully pulpit of moral exhortation with the exigencies of conducting foreign 
policy in a complicated world.” Conversely, academic critics “took aim at the 
very idea of singling out religion for protection”, while human rights activists 
“worried about the effect of the new U.S. initiative on multilateral approaches to 
human rights around the world.” Though described as a “debate among 
friends,”48 over the course of the two-day conference “the veneer of politeness . 
. . rubbed away and . . . the participants were mixing it up with considerable 
vehemence.”49 
As one manifestation of this academic critique, Johan D. van der Vyver 
blasted IRFA for exemplifying the United States’ “sense of self-righteous-
ness,” by presuming to judge other states “while refusing to submit itself to the 
dictates of international law.”50 Van der Vyver also questioned the flexibility 
IRFA provided the president for waiving action against designated CPCs on 
the basis of national interest: “The flexibility component . . . is also highly 
questionable from the perspective of the basic principles of justice in politics 
and in jurisprudence…Jurisprudentially, religious persecution ought not to 
escape punitive action…at the pleasure of the agency of enforcement.”51  
In a similar vein, Peter Danchin criticized IRFA’s creation of an 
“irrational hierarchy of human rights in U.S. foreign policy that makes the 
act vulnerable to politicization and abuse of the human rights agenda.”52 
Danchin further claimed IRFA “demonstrate[d] a failure of international 
participation and cooperation”53 and “indirectly perpetuate[d] a strand of 
thinking in U.S. foreign policy that views the international order as being 
divided into two camps—liberal and illiberal.”54 
																																								 																				
48 CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF RELIGION IN PUBLIC LIFE, TRINITY COLLEGE; RELIGIOUS 
PERSECUTION AS A U.S. POLICY ISSUE: PROCEEDINGS OF A CONSULTATION HELD AT TRINITY 
COLLEGE 3 (Rosalind I. J. Hackett, et al., eds., 2000).  
49 Id. 
50 Johan D. van der Vyver, American Exceptionalism: Human Rights, International Criminal 
Justice, and National Self-Righteousness, 50 EMORY L. J. 775, 827 (2001). Van der Vyer 
questioned IRFA’s constitutionality as “entangling” the federal government in religion and 
presuming to apply a suspect “religious test” for appointments to USCIRF. Id. at 828. 
51 Id. at 829. Van der Vyver concedes that IRFA “serves at least one useful purpose: the 
accumulation and publication of factual data on the state of religious freedom in different 
countries of the world.” Id. at 828. 
52 Peter G. Danchin, U.S. Unilateralism and the International Protection of Religious 
Freedom: The Multilateral Alternative, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 33, 41 (2002). 
53 Id. at 41. 
54 Id. at 42. Danchin’s proposed solution for remedying violations of freedom of religion or 
belief is premised on a “transnational legal process whereby internal and external actors are 
engaged in a process of repeated interaction in such a way that the relevant norms eventually 
become internalized in the constitutional, legal, and political systems of all states.” Id. at 135. 
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Writing during the same period, other observers attempted to address 
and rebut these and similar critiques. For example, Jeremy Gunn, who held 
early positions at USCIRF and the State Department’s Office of International 
Religious Freedom, rejected the assertion that IRFA reflected only the 
“political interests of the Christian Right.”55 Rather, he found “no obvious 
effort by the United States to favor Christians nor to seek remedies for 
Christian groups at the expense of other faiths.”56 Reinforcing this 
perspective, Allen D. Hertzke observed that the campaign for IRFA’s passage 
brought together “a wide coalition of unlikely allies” moving beyond 
evangelical groups exclusively to include “Jewish organizations, the 
Episcopal Church, the Catholic Conference [of Bishops], Tibetan Buddhists, 
and Iranian Bahá’ís among many others.”57 Further, because IRFA’s 
yardstick for measuring religious freedom was grounded in international 
norms, Hertzke argued U.S. officials could “legitimately…claim that they are 
not attempting to impose ‘our values’ on the rest of the world. Rather, in 
implementing IRFA the United States is merely calling upon other nations to 
live up to covenants they have approved.”58  
Addressing the complaint that IRFA established an improper 
“hierarchy of human rights. . .  [with] religion freedom at its zenith,”59 Gunn 
countered that the legislation did not prioritize freedom of religion, but 
instead functioned to highlight “an important, vulnerable, and heretofore 
neglected right.”60 In direct response to Danchin’s claim that IRFA embodied 
U.S. unilateralism, Gunn was even blunter:  
 
[O]ne suspects that if the United States were not the target, 
Danchin and the globalists would not be so critical of unilateral 
action… . No country, and certainly not the United States, 
should be exempted from criticism. But Danchin’s article 
																																								 																				
55 T. Jeremy Gunn, A Preliminary Response to Criticisms of the International Religious 
Freedom Act of 1998, 2000 B. Y. U. L. REV. 841, 851 (2000). 
56 Id. at 855. 
57 Allen D. Hertzke, International Religious Freedom Policy: Taking Stock, 2 FAITH & INT’L 
AFF. 17, 19 (2008). 
58 Id. at 18. 
59 Gunn, supra note 55, at 856. While conceding that IRFA will face an uphill struggle if it 
is perceived as “promoting a peculiarly American notion of religious freedom,” Gunn 
concluded “IRFA’s critics . . . frequently caricature the law and the efforts of the United 
States by loosely employing clichés such as ‘Lone Ranger,’ ‘imperialism,’ and ‘market-
oriented religion.’ Such rhetorical criticisms are made without fully understanding how 
American diplomats actually engage other governments in discussions regarding 
discrimination on the basis of religion.” Id. at 865. 
60 Id. at 857. 
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exemplifies a real problem that sometimes occurs in the human 
rights community: subjecting the United States to an 
exceptional form of criticism that can often lead to exaggerated 
and distorted analysis.61 
 
Despite the effort of Gunn and others, many of the same criticisms 
and misconceptions surrounding IRFA persisted or evolved over time.62 For 
example, writing in 2005, Eugenia Relano Pastor concluded that “While 
IRFA sets out to protect international religious freedom, its enforcement is 
undermined by the United States’ other foreign policy interests, such as the 
war on terrorism, and a decidedly unilateral approach to the achievement of 
religious liberty around the globe.”63 José Casanova similarly reiterated that 
IRFA is perceived as being “culturally insensitive or imperialistic”64 and that 
“the United States doesn’t have a very good record in recognizing the 
applicability of international law to itself.”65  
This debate persisted well into IRFA’s second decade, with policy-
makers, academics and activists alike continuing to take sides over the merits of 
U.S. reporting and policing of religious freedom conditions abroad.66 For 
example, at a Pew Research Center forum held to commemorate ten years since 
IRFA’s passage, John Shattuck, the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, 
Human Rights, and Labor under President Clinton, observed that four key 
misconceptions continued to hamper IRFA’s effectives: first, the “legislation 
																																								 																				
61 T. Jeremy Gunn, American Exceptionalism and Globalist Double Standards: A More 
Balanced Alternative, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 137, 151–52 (2002). 
62 Eugenia Relano Pastor, The Flawed Implementation of the International Religious 
Freedom Act of 1998: A European Perspective, 2005 B.Y. U. L. REV. 711, 739 (2005). Pastor 
takes issue with some of Gunn’s rebuttals, and argues, among other things that “it is difficult, 
if not impossible, for IRFA not to be influenced by the American historical experience 
regarding freedom of religion ideas” and that actual enforcement of IRFA “inevitably yields 
to the United States’ other foreign and domestic interests.” Id. at 739, 743. 
63 Id. at 712. Observing that every CPC except for Burma successfully escaped new sanctions 
under IRFA, Pastor concludes that “actions taken under IRFA have been very limited, if 
existent at all.” Id at 742. This corresponds with the evidence presented in the table above. 
64 José Casanova, Balancing Religious Freedom and Cultural Preservation, 2 FAITH & INT’L 
AFFAIRS 13, 14 (2008). 
65 Id at 15. 
66 For example, an entire volume of THE REVIEW OF FAITH & INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS is 
dedicated to contemplating IRFA at its ten-year anniversary. REV. FAITH & INT’L AFF. 
(2008). Another recent critical take on IRFA presented by Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, argues 
the statute represents “the latest installment in a history of U.S. attempts to promote 
American strategic interests through social and religious engineering projects abroad.” 
Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, Religious Freedom, American-Style, in RELIGIOUS RIGHTS 106 
(Lorenzo Zucca ed., 2015). 
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predominantly represents the interests of missionary religions, interested in 
proselytizing and changing people’s religious views in other countries”; second, 
“the U.S. cares more about religious freedom as we define it than about other 
international human rights”; third, it “is based on a punitive model, in which 
mandatory sanctions are imposed”; and fourth, that it exemplifies U.S. 
unilateralism.67 Though Shattuck attempted to rebut these misconceptions, he 
also acknowledged that IRFA’s effectiveness continued to be undermined by the 
inability to move beyond “naming and shaming” to the “much larger effort to 
connect religious freedom with the mainstream of our foreign policy.”68 More 
practically, a 2013 report prepared for Congress by the Government 
Accountability Office concluded that while the State Department and USCIRF 
were implementing their responsibilities under IRFA, “they have not defined 
how they should interact, which has at times created tensions with foreign-
government officials.”69 
Other observers build on the concern that IRFA has not been 
implemented effectively. For example, Thomas Farr, Former Director of the 
Department of State’s Office of International Religious Freedom, observed 
that Democratic and Republican administrations as well as the State 
Department have failed to make promotion of religious liberty a central 
element of U.S. foreign policy. Instead, these actors have opted to relegate 
IRFA to nothing more “than a narrow humanitarian measure unrelated to 
broader U.S. interests.”70 To remedy this, Farr has argued a major change in 
approach is necessary: “U.S. diplomacy should move resolutely to make the 
defense and expansion of religious freedom a core component of U.S. foreign 
policy. Doing so would give the United States a powerful new tool for 
advancing ordered liberty and for undermining religion-based extremism at 
a time when other strategies have proved inadequate.”71  
Farr’s emphasis relies on policymakers reorienting IRFA’s priority 
away from opposing religious persecution and freeing religious prisoners in 
favor of a more “sustained discourse” that instead emphasizes the promotion 
																																								 																				
67 John Shattuck, CEO, John F. Kennedy Library Foundation, Remarks at the Panel on 
International Religious Freedom: Religion and International Diplomacy (May 8, 2007) 
(transcript available at http://www.pewforum.org/2007/05/08/international-religious-freedom-
religion-and-international-diplomacy [https://perma.cc/AML8-THP5]).  
68 Id. 
69 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-13-196, INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
ACT: STATE DEPARTMENT AND COMMISSION ARE IMPLEMENTING RESPONSIBILITIES BUT 
NEED TO IMPROVE INTERACTION 28 (2013). 
70 Thomas Farr, Diplomacy in an Age of Faith: Religious Freedom and National Security, 
87 FOREIGN AFF. 110, 111 (2008). 
71 Id. 
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of “political order centered on religious liberty.” In contrast, Hertzke has 
concluded that the “transformational change” necessary to cement IRFA’s 
success must come from a “renewed commitment among religious commun-
ities to extend the freedom they enjoy in the United States to others around 
the globe.” As evidence of the absence of this commitment, Hertzke 
commented in 2008: “It is telling that, in contrast to trafficking legislation 
pressed by the same faith-based movement, IRFA has not subsequently been 
amended… efforts to strengthen the law seem warranted.”72 
 
II. THE EFFORT TO AMEND IRFA, 2015-2016: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
ON THE ROAD TO PUBLIC LAW 114-281 
 
While IRFA did undergo several small changes since its passage in 
1998,73 Hertze’s observation concerning the absence of a concerted effort to 
strengthen the law continued to hold true, at least until 2016.74 The amend-
ments authorized by President Obama at the end of that year represent the 
most significant overhaul of IRFA since its inception. Congress intended 
these amendments to “improve the ability of the United States to advance 
religious freedom globally.”75 However, the underpinning legislative history 
reveals ongoing disagreements over the extent to which religious freedom 
should inform U.S. foreign policy. Further, this legislative history also brings 
into question the extent to which the United States government is prepared to 
commit resources to its continued policing and betterment. 
This section traces the Wolf Act’s legislative history to uncover the 
compromises and changes demanded before Congress moved to approve 
amendments to IRFA. Using the original House bill submitted in early 2015 as 
																																								 																				
72 Hertzke, supra note 57, at 22. Among other things, Hertzke suggests “a religious freedom 
specialist be appointed to the National Security Council”; elevating the IRF office within the 
State Department; requiring “[b]roader religious training for diplomatic personnel”; and 
prohibiting the president from “double hatting” sanctions “to provide more teeth and 
bargaining leverage.” Id. at 22–23. 
73 Until 2016, IRFA-related amendments typically tweaked statutory language or addressed 
reauthorization and reform of USCIRF. For example, see An Act to amend the International 
Religious Freedom Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 113-154, 128 Stat. 1827 (2014) (codified at 22 
U.S.C. § 6401), and United States Commission on International Religious Freedom Reform 
and Reauthorization Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-75, 125 Stat. 1272 (2011) (codified at 22 
U.S.C. § 6401). 
74 In 2011, Frank Wolf, author of the original 1998 IRFA statute, introduced the International 
Religious Freedom Act Amendments of 2011. International Religious Freedom Act 
Amendments of 2011, H.R. 1846, 112th Cong. (2011). This bill included several of the 
amendments contained in the 2015 Wolf Act; however, it never came to a vote in Congress.  
75 Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 114-281, 130 Stat. 1426 
(2016) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6401). 
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a departure point, the ensuing history demonstrates that numerous provisions 
intended to boost IRFA’s effectiveness were either diluted or altogether 
removed. In many cases, these changes meant abandoning sought after 
improvements or leaving in their place vague and open-ended provisions 
unlikely to achieve intended results. 
 
A. Wolf Act as Originally Introduced – February 2015 
 
Representative Chris Smith (R-NJ) introduced major amendments to 
IRFA in February 2015. According to Smith, the impetus for House Resolution 
1150, the “Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act of 2015,” 
stemmed from recognition that IRFA needed “to be updated to match the new 
challenges of the 21st century…by upgrading the tools, training and resources 
used by the administration to advance this fundamental human right.” In Smith’s 
view, adopting H.R. 1150’s proposed amendments would “better address a 
growing religious persecution globally and help the administration and State 
Department to better respond to violent extremism globally as well.”76  
Religious freedom advocates and human rights organizations 
generally supported the effort to revise IRFA. For example, the United States 
Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) considered H.R. 1150 “an 
important first step in improving the [United States’] ability . . . to advance 
religious freedom globally. It would signify the determination of the United 
States to promote and protect this most fundamental of human rights.”77 
Similarly, the International Religious Freedom Roundtable, an umbrella 
group of over 30 “organizations and individuals who are scholars, religious 
leaders, human rights advocates and practitioners” called attention to the 
“deepening crisis” surrounding international religious freedom.78 This group 
reasoned the amendments reflected in H.R. 1150 would “send a clear and 
urgent message regarding the inherent dignity of every human being, as well 
as our common global security in the fight against persecution and religious 
extremism, and terrorism.”79 
																																								 																				
76 Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act of 2015; and Calling for the Release 
of Ukrainian Fighter Pilot Nadiya Savechenko, supra note 43 at 50–51 (statement of Rep. 
Christopher H. Smith, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Afr., Global Health, Global Human 
Rights, and Int’l Orgs). 
77 H.R. Doc. No. 114-62, at 58 (2015) (providing a letter from the U.S. Conference of 
Catholic Bishops in support of H.R. 1150). 
78 Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act of 2015; and Calling for the Release 
of Ukrainian Fighter Pilot Nadiya Savechenko, supra note 43 at 50–51. 
79 Id. at 59 (providing a letter from the International Religious Freedom Roundtable in 
support of H.R. 1150). 
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  During the bill’s original markup before the House Subcommittee on 
Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations, 
Rep. Smith highlighted several specific changes his amendments to IRFA 
sought to achieve, including:  
 
• Better training to “equip diplomats to counter terrorism, 
address anti-Semitism . . . end religious persecution and miti-
gate sectarian conflict”; 
• Enhancing the position of the Ambassador-at-Large for 
International Religious Freedom, by requiring direct report-
ing to the Secretary of State; 
• Creating “a new special watch list” that would introduce a 
tier system for reporting on violations of freedom of religion 
or belief, for the purpose of putting “on notice those countries 
that should be or are close to being a CPC”;80 
• A reauthorization of USCIRF until 2021;81 and 
• Enabling the president to designate non-state actors . . . 
“as severe violators of international religious freedom.”82 
 
Several of these changes augured a dramatic expansion of IRFA. To 
justify them, Smith’s draft offered new legislative findings to supplement 
those already underpinning IRFA. Among other things, these findings noted 
“growing evidence that demonstrates a connection between the absence of 
religious freedom and increased levels of…religiously motivated conflict, 
violent extremism, and terrorism, including the kind of terrorism that has 
reached the United States.” Further, H.R. 1150 asserted it was “increasingly 
clear that understanding religion and the political and security implications 
of religious motivation and conviction is critical to the success of United 
States diplomacy and foreign policy initiatives.”83  
On diplomatic training, IRFA originally required the Secretary of State 
to “establish as part of the standard training” for foreign service officers (FSOs) 
“instruction in the field of internationally recognized human rights.”84 The 
																																								 																				
80 Id.  
81 United States Commission on International Religious Freedom Reauthorization Act of 2015, 
Pub. L. No. 114-71, § 3, 129 Stat. 563 (2015) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6401, 6342) reauthorized 
USCIRF through fiscal year 2019.  
82 Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act of 2015; and Calling for the Release 
of Ukrainian Fighter Pilot Nadiya Savechenko, supra note 43 at 51. 
83 Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act, H.R. 1150, 114th Cong. § 2 (2015). 
84 International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-292, § 708, 112 Stat. 2787, 
2795 (1998) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 4028). 
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statute directed that training include “instruction on international documents 
and United States policy in human rights” and “instruction on the internationally 
recognized right to freedom of religion, the nature, activities, and beliefs of 
different religions, and the various aspects and manifestations of violations of 
religious freedom.”85 However, IRFA only designated as mandatory the former, 
and then, only for those FSO members “having reporting responsibilities 
relating to human rights and for chiefs of mission.”86  
In practice, the extent and effectiveness of the training that emerged 
from the State Department testified to an ambivalent implementation which 
likely fell short of meaningfully connecting religious freedom to mainstream 
U.S. foreign policy. According to Thomas Farr, the results were disappointing: 
“For the past 12 years training has been ad hoc, inconsistent and ineffective.”87 
A Congressionally-mandated GAO report from 2013 confirmed that the State 
Department had “taken steps to implement” its obligation to integrate religious 
freedom into its FSO training. However, its assessment betrayed an apathetic 
and perfunctory approach. According to the GAO’s findings, since IRFA’s 
passage, the Foreign Service Institute managed only to add “religious freedom 
to . . . a 90-minute session covering human rights” that is mandatory for 
political and economic officers and to require new FSOs to attend a mandatory 
1-hour orientation session “on human rights that includes information about 
international religious freedom.” In addition, State required “chiefs of mission 
to take a 2-week ambassadorial seminar, which includes a 45-minute session 
on global issues, including human rights.” Lastly, beginning in 2011 State 
began piloting an optional three-day “religious freedom–specific course titled 
‘Religion and Foreign Policy’.” This voluntary course was subsequently 
expanded to four days but had been offered only three times over a period of 
two years.88 Aside from its late introduction and non-mandatory nature, this 
course also drew criticism for “not focus[ing] on U.S. international religious 
freedom policy so much as [on] the idea of religious engagement.”89 
																																								 																				
85 Id. 
86 Id.  
87 Prioritizing International Religious Freedom in U.S. Foreign Policy: Hearing Before the 
H. Subcomm. on Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights of the H. Comm. on Foreign 
Affairs, 112th Cong. 42 (2011) (statement of Thomas Farr, Director, Religious Freedom 
Project, Berkley Center For Religion, Peace, and World Affairs, Georgetown University). 
88 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 69 at 18. Farr questioned the effectiveness 
of this course due to its “occasional and voluntary” nature. Prioritizing International 
Religious Freedom in U.S. Foreign Policy, supra note 87. 
89 Prioritizing International Religious Freedom in U.S. Foreign Policy, supra note 87, at 43 
(statement of Mr. Thomas Farr, Director, Religious Freedom Project, Berkley Center for 
Religion, Peace, and World Affairs, Georgetown University). 
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In response to this track record on training, the Wolf Act’s new 
provision on mandatory training90 obligated the Secretary of State to carry 
out an elaborate religious freedom curriculum covering: 
 
. . . the scope and strategic value of international religious 
freedom, how violations of international religious freedom 
harm fundamental United States interests, how the 
advancement of international religious freedom can advance 
such interests, how United States international religious 
freedom policy should be carried out in practice by United 
States diplomats and other Foreign Service officers, and the 
relevance and relationship of international religious freedom 
to United States defense, diplomacy, development, and public 
affairs efforts to combat violent extremism.91 
 
The bill required this curriculum to be implemented within one year 
of enactment of the law and also made training mandatory for “all Foreign 
Service officers . . . including all entry level officers, all officers prior to 
departure for posting outside the United States, and all outgoing deputy chiefs 
of mission and ambassadors.”92 Further, it required such training “be shared 
with the United States Armed Forces, intelligence community . . . and all 
other Federal departments and agencies whose personnel serve as attachés, 
advisors, or detailees in United States embassies globally.”93 The inclusion 
of robust and mandatory training for all FSOs signaled a win for USCIRF and 
others that had long advocated for such a measure.94 Its incorporation as a 
																																								 																				
90 This provision borrowed from and significantly expanded upon a previously abandoned 
effort to amend the State Department’s religious freedom training. See International 
Religious Freedom Acts Amendments of 2011, H.R. 1846, 112th Cong. § 103 (2011).  
91 Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act, H.R. 1150, 114th Cong. § 103 (2015). 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Supporters in Congress had attempted to pass similar amendments to the State Department’s 
religious freedom training previously. See International Religious Freedom Act Amendments 
of 2011, H.R. 1856, 112th Cong. §103 (2011) (noting the required training for foreign service 
officers.); see also Prioritizing International Religious Freedom in U.S. Foreign Policy, supra 
note 87, at 33 (statement of Mr. Leonard Leo, USCIRF chairman) (noting “while there is some 
training in religious freedom for Foreign Service officers there needs to be more, and it needs 
to be part of the core curriculum.”); HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, HOW TO PROMOTE INTERNATIONAL 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: BLUEPRINT FOR THE NEXT ADMINISTRATION 12 (2012) (recommending, 
among other things, “that religious freedom and religious literacy curricula be incorporated into 
Foreign Service Institute (FSI) A100 courses, area-study courses, and mandatory training for 
all ambassadors and deputy chiefs of mission.”). 
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needed amendment to IRFA also reflected at least a partial remedy for the 
impression religious freedom was languishing as a core component of U.S. 
foreign policy.  
To further support this training curriculum and create a more “sustained 
discourse” on religious freedom as a key part of U.S. foreign policy, the 
proposed legislation also included long-sought upgrades to the Ambassador at 
Large for Religious Freedom (IRF) and the Office on International Religious 
Freedom (OIRF). With respect to the Ambassador at Large, IRFA’s original 
structure envisioned the IRF Ambassador to “be a principal adviser to the 
President and the Secretary of State.”95 However, in practice, the State 
Department relegated OIRF within the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, 
and Labor (DRL) (headed by an assistant secretary of state) and under the 
oversight of the Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human 
Rights (J).96 This organizational structure had the effect of twice removing the 
Ambassador at Large from access to the Secretary of State. Moreover, it stood 
in contrast with other State Department Special Envoys and Special 
Representatives—as well as similarly situated ambassadors at large—who 
maintained a direct line of communication to or were housed within the Office 
of the Secretary of State.97 In Thomas Farr’s view, this practice had deleterious 
effects: “When senior meetings are held on U.S. policy in China or Saudi 
Arabia—or even on engaging Islam—the IRF function is not considered 
relevant. This may seem trivial to those outside the State Department. Inside, 
it communicates a deadly message: IRF is not a mainstream foreign policy 
issue and can safely be ignored.”98 
The State Department’s track record of discounting the IRF ambass-
ador did not go unnoticed by Congress. In 2011, Former Rep. Frank Wolf 
lamented the fact that “[o]ver successive administrations this critical position 
has not been treated with the seniority it deserves.”99 In response, he introduced 
legislation intended to repair the stature of the IRF ambassador and office. 
While this proposed legislative fix ultimately languished in committee, the 
2015 Wolf Act as introduced revived the proposals and expanded upon 
																																								 																				
95 International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-292, §101, 112 Stat. 2787 
(1998) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6401). 
96 See U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, ORGANIZATION CHART (2016), https://www.state.gov/documents/ 
organization/263637.pdf.; see also U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 1 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL 40: THE 
UNDER SECRETARIES OF STATE (2018) (detailing that the State Department’s DRL Bureau, 
overseen by an assistant secretary, reports to the Under Secretary for Civilian Security, 
Democracy, and Human Rights).  
97 U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, ORGANIZATION CHART supra note 96.   
98 Farr, supra note 70, at 118.  
99 157 CONG. REC. 854 (2011) (statement of Rep. Frank R. Wolf). 
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them.100 Two foundational changes directed that the IRF office “shall be 
located in the Office of the Secretary of State” and that the IRF Ambassador 
“shall report directly to the Secretary of State.”101 These proposed amendments 
would not only have the visual effect of aligning the IRF issue with other “at 
large” diplomatic priorities, but would serve to erase the existing bureaucratic 
distance between IRF and the Secretary of State. 
To reinforce these structural changes, the bill also attached sweeping 
new responsibilities to the IRF Ambassador’s mandate and sought to elevate 
the influence of the office. Beyond generally advancing the right to freedom 
of religion abroad and recommending appropriate responses, the Ambassador 
would now strive more specifically to: 
 
. . . integrate United States international religious freedom 
policies and religious engagement strategies into democracy, 
civil society, conflict prevention and mitigation, and 
development efforts funded by the United States and into the 
counterterrorism policies of Federal agencies, including the 
Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, 
the Department of State, and the Department of the Treasury.102 
 
Furthermore, the ambassador would be tasked with the new duty of 
coordinating “religious freedom policies and religious engagement strategies 
across all programs, projects, and activities of the United States.” This 
responsibility envisioned the IRF Ambassador engaging in an open-ended 
manner with “any appropriate programs, projects, and activities of the 
Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department 
of State, the Department of the Treasury, and the United States Agency for 
International Development.”103 
To reinforce the import attached to these new responsibilities, H.R. 
1150 as introduced upgraded the IRF Ambassador’s standing from “a principle 
advisor” to “the principle advisor” to the President and the Secretary of State 
on matters affecting religious freedom abroad.104 Together with this, the draft 
legislation also sought to strengthen OIRF. It specified that staffing would 
consist of “individuals to fill at least 20 full-time equivalent staff positions, and 
																																								 																				
100 Compare International Religious Freedom Act Amendments of 2011, H.R. 1856, 112th 
Cong. §101 and Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act, H.R. 1150, 114th Cong. 
§ 101 (2015).  
101 H.R. 1856, §101.  
102 Id.  
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
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other temporary staff positions as needed…including a senior advisor for the 
Office.”105 Funding for the office would be secured at a level sufficient to 
enable OIRF to conduct investigations “on conditions of religious freedom on 
a worldwide basis, and for any necessary travel to carry out the provisions of 
this Act.” Further, the Secretary of State would provide the IRF Ambassador 
with “representation funds that are sufficient to carry out the duties 
described…at least equal to the amount of representation funds provided to 
other Ambassadors at Large in the Department of State.”106  
Related to these changes intended to secure the integration of 
international religious freedom matters within the decision-making echelons of 
the federal government, H.R. 1150 also sought to install a new Special Adviser 
for Global Religion Engagement and International Religious Freedom within 
the National Security Council (NSC). As originally enacted, IRFA contained 
only a “sense of Congress” provision suggesting the president appoint a Special 
Adviser on International Religious Freedom to serve as a resource within the 
NSC.107 Such “sense of” provisions “merely express the opinion of Congress 
or the relevant chamber. They have no formal effect on public policy and have 
no force of law.”108 That said, they may serve as incubators for potential shifts 
in Congressional policy priorities or provide “an early signal that Congress will 
alter statutory provisions” where its informally expressed will is insufficient to 
effectively influence policy.109  
Over IRFA’s lifetime, no president ever acted to follow through with 
Congress’ recommendation to staff the NSC with an IRF advisor.110 Faced 
with this inaction, H.R. 1150 moved to replace the “sense of Congress” provi-
sion with a requirement that the president appoint an NSC special advisor with 
more senior status and a broader set of responsibilities. Rather than sit at a 
director level, the new special advisor position would be “comparable to that 
of a senior director.”111 Similarly, rather than be tasked with generally serving 
																																								 																				
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-292, § 301, 112 Stat. 2787 
(1998) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6401). 
108 CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-825, “SENSE OF” RESOLUTIONS 
AND PROVISIONS 1 (2016). 
109 Id. at 2. 
110 Joseph K. Grieboski, It is Time to Prioritize Religious Freedom in U.S. Foreign Policy, 
HUFF. POST (Jun. 8, 2011), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/joseph-k-grieboski/it-is-time-to-
prioritize-_b_872758.html [https://perma.cc/PK6X-AHGB].  
111 Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act of 2015: Markup Before the 
Subcomm. on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations 
of the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 114th Cong. §301 (statement of Rep. Smith). 
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as a resource for executive branch officials, making policy recommendations, 
and serving as liaison with the IRF Ambassador and USCIRF, the new 
provision defined responsibilities in concrete detail. For example, the new 
special advisor would assist the IRF Ambassador “to coordinate international 
religious freedom policies” and “develop policy recommendations and 
strategies relevant to the programs, projects, [and] activities” across a variety 
of Federal departments and agencies.112 
The Wolf Act as introduced also directed the NSC to establish two 
permanent interagency policy committees. The first, covering “International 
Religious Freedom and Global Religion Engagement,” was to be chaired by 
the IRF Ambassador and tasked with developing “a strategy globally to 
advance international religious freedom.” The second, on “Religion, Intern-
ational Religious Freedom, and National Security,” was to be co-chaired by the 
IRF Ambassador and Deputy National Security Advisor, and tasked with 
identifying “potential national security risks related to the absence of religious 
freedom globally.”113  
 These proposed permanent committees further evidenced the desire of 
IRFA supporters to provide international religious freedom advocacy with a 
greater voice within the executive branch and deepen the IRF Ambassador’s 
role in the policy formulation process. They also signaled an effort to push past 
IRFA’s original vision by creating not only a figurehead presence within the 
NSC, but new institutionalized frameworks intended to position religion and 
religious freedom as central considerations in policy analysis and policy 
creation.114 As if to underscore the import of these proposed changes, the bill 
required the President to promulgate regulations implementing the new 
committees within 90 days. Related to this, the bill, through a nonbinding 
“sense of Congress” provision, called on the president’s annual national 
security strategy report to “promote international religious freedom as a foreign 
policy and national security priority” and to serve as “a guide for the strategies 
and activities of relevant Federal agencies” as well as inform quadrennial 
reviews at the Department of Defense and Department of State.115 
The 2015 amendments championed by Rep. Smith also sought to bring 
greater nuance to IRFA’s CPC designation process. By introducing a formalized 
																																								 																				
112 Id. 
113 H.R. 1150, §301.  
114 See International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-292, § 101, 112 Stat. 
2787 (1998) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6401) (noting Rep. Wolf’s 2011 effort at amending 
IRFA did not put forward a similar provision for the creation of NSC committees 
incorporating consideration of religion and religious freedom.) 
115 Id. at § 703.  
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“Special Watch List,”116 the president could for the first time single out a country 
or class of countries violating religious freedom but falling short of the statutory 
requirements necessary to trigger CPC status. In Rep. Smith’s view, this change 
would enable IRFA to benefit from a system already in use by the State 
Department as part of its mandated reporting on trafficking in persons. An  
added tier or level of scrutiny to IRFA’s Manichean bad/other template could 
serve to “put on notice those countries that should be or are close to being a CPC 
. . . so that we can begin working diplomatically to prioritize those countries.”117 
Notably, this new intermediate designation came with a significant 
escalatory trigger. According to the terms of the proposed amendment, any 
country appearing on the Special Watch List “in more than 2 consecutive Annual 
[International Religious Freedom] Reports”, “in any 4 Annual Reports”, or “in 
more than 1 Annual Report [if the country had previously been designated a 
CPC]” would be subject to an automatic redesignation as a CPC. While this 
provision included executive discretion to waive the automatic CPC designation 
in two of the three triggering situations, it capped this ability at two years.118 
More dramatically, the Special Watch List was also drafted in a manner that 
would make it applicable to a new category of actors subject to scrutiny under 
IRFA: violent nonstate actors (NSAs). 
Extending IRFA’s scrutiny to violent NSAs engaging in or tolerating 
violations of religious freedom119 signaled one of the most significant policy 
changes proposed by Rep. Smith’s Wolf Act. Plainly, the decision to add NSAs 
intended to account for organizations such as ISIS and Boko Haram,120 
																																								 																				
116 USCIRF has long maintained a “watch list” (now designated as Tier 2 countries) that includes 
countries where “religious freedom conditions do not rise to the statutory level that would 
mandate a CPC designation but require close monitoring due to the nature and extent of violations 
of religious freedom engaged in or tolerated by governments.” In 2017, USCIRF’s Tier 2 list 
consisted of: Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Cuba, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Kazakhstan, 
Laos, Malaysia, and Turkey. Frequently Asked Questions, USCIRF, http://www.uscirf.gov/about 
-uscirf/frequently-asked-questions#FAQ%206 [https://perma.cc/E9VF-34UA] (last visited on 
Dec. 20, 2018).  
117 Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act of 2015; and Calling for the Release 
of Ukrainian Fighter Pilot Nadiya Savechenko, supra note 43, at 51.  
118 Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act, H.R. 1150, 114th Cong. § 402 
(2015). The scope of this provision appears to have been restricted to countries only: “The 
President may waive the application of clauses (i) or (ii) . . . with respect to a country for up 
to 2 years . . . .” Id. (emphasis added).  
119 H.R. 1150, § 102. 
120 Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act of 2015; and Calling for the Release 
of Ukrainian Fighter Pilot Nadiya Savechenko, supra note 43, at 50 (statement Rep. Smith) 
(“We see daily headlines of beheadings, kidnappings, mob attacks, and arrests carried out by 
ISIS, al-Shabaab, Boko Haram and many other groups.”). 
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notorious for their religiously-motivated acts of violence targeting non-
conforming Muslims and religious minorities. To justify providing IRFA with 
the new ability to formally scrutinize and respond to such non-state actors, H.R. 
1150 proffered two key findings. First, it formally recognized121 that “religious 
leaders and believers are targeted by . . . violent nonstate actors”122 in addition 
to more conventional national security forces. Second, H.R. 1150 found that 
such violent NSAs are an expanding force123 responsible for exposing a 
significant percentage of the global population to severe restrictions on 
freedom of religion and belief.124  
With these legislative findings in place, H.R. 1150 sought to apply 
IRFA’s existing CPC framework—including its trigger of mandatory 
presidential action125—to violent NSAs. To do so, the bill set out a novel defi-
nition126 for “violent non-state actor.” 127 To qualify for scrutiny under IRFA, 
an NSA would need to be a “nonsovereign entity or group that—(A) exercises 
significant political power or influence at a national or international level; and 
(B) engages in, finances, or tolerates violations of religious freedom, terrorism, 
or violence or discrimination targeting religious minorities.”128 The statute as 
introduced provided no guidance on the meaning to be associated with terms 
such as “nonsovereign” or “significant political power.”  
Using this definition for NSAs as a jump-off point, the bill outlined a 
“Statement of Policy Regarding Country of Particular Concern Designation For 
Violent Nonstate Actors.” This statement established that U.S. policy would 
consider violent NSAs that have engaged in or tolerated violations of religious 
freedom as “eligible for designation as countries of particular concern.”129 When 
designated as such, the full array of presidential actions—from private demarche 
to procurement and contract prohibitions as well as a bar on visas and admission 
to the United States130—“should be applicable to [such groups] or individual 
																																								 																				
121 H.R. 1150, § 407 (acknowledging that “various administrations have made [CPC] desig-
nations targeting violent nonstate actors . . . such as the Taliban and Serbian groups carrying 
on atrocities against Bosnians”). 
122 Id. at § 2.  
123 Id. at § 407.  
124 Id. at § 2. 
125 Id. at § 402 (describing “[p]residential actions in response to particularly severe violations 
of religious freedom”). 
126 There is no statutory precedent for the definition. The author’s conversations with individuals 
involved in the drafting process indicate it was crafted based on a review of academic literature. 
127 Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act, H.R. 1150, 114th Cong. § 3 (2015). 
128 Id.  
129 Id. at § 407. 
130 International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-292, § 405, 112 Stat. 2787, 
2806–07 (1998) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6445).  
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members of such groups.”131 Finally, to strengthen this proposed framework for 
dealing with violent NSAs—and to further build up the significance of USCIRF 
recommendations—the bill required the president to furnish Congress with 
reasons in the event such a group was not listed as a CPC, “particularly if 
[USCIRF] made a recommendation for such a designation.”132  
A final example underscoring the effort to entrench NSA monitoring 
and reporting in IRFA (and to further empower USCIRF) is reflected in the 
bill’s proposal to establish a regularly updated “Victims List.” This list, to be 
maintained by USCIRF, was envisioned as a new tool for drawing attention 
to persons “imprisoned, detained, disappeared” or otherwise harmed because 
of their “religious activity or religious freedom advocacy.” Regarding NSAs 
specifically, the provision allowed for including on the list those individuals 
subjected to harm at the hands of a foreign government or a “violent nonstate 
actor that the Commission recommends for designation as a country of 
particular concern.”133 
Although the new NSA-related provisions represented a major 
component of the Wolf Act’s amendments, it bears recalling that the original 
omission of nonstate actors from IRFA was not generally considered a major 
shortcoming of the statute. In fact, IRFA’s track record suggested that both the 
U.S. government and USCIRF found its provisions sufficiently flexible to 
designate unrecognized countries and regimes as CPCs despite IRFA’s original 
language remaining silent on making such allowances. In any case, as will be 
seen below, the operative definition for NSAs and IRFA’s ability to police 
them would be subject to much debate and revision before final passage of the 
Wolf Act. 
Beyond seeking to incorporate NSAs into IRFA’s purview, the Wolf 
Act as introduced contained several additional amendments that merit 
attention. One set of these changes underscored the effort to inhibit IRFA’s 
allowance for executive discretion. First, the act sought to tighten deadlines 
surrounding IRFA’s reporting and designation obligations. The issue of delays 
and inaction on the part of the executive branch was a longstanding and recog-
nized problem. For example, USCIRF had previously “expressed concern 
about the lack of any CPC designations by the Bush State Department between 
																																								 																				
131 H.R. 1150, §407. 
132 Id. Prior to these changes, while IRFA did mandate “[a]n assessment and description of 
the nature and extent of violations of religious freedom in each foreign country, including . . . 
religious persecution by . . . non-governmental entities,” it did not explicitly subject such 
entities to presidential action. International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-
292, § 101, 112 Stat. 2787, 2787 (1998) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6401). 
133 Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act, H.R. 1150, 114th Cong. § 104 (2015). 
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November 2006 and January 2009” as well as the failure of the Obama 
administration to make timely CPC designations.134 Thus, the amendments 
moved to replace vague language calling, for example, on the president to 
report and act on countries violating religious freedom “as expeditiously as 
practicable”, with fixed deadlines of 90 days from release of the OIRF annual 
report.135 Similarly, the new bill required that the president undertake 
consultations with a country targeted with serious sanctions within 90 days 
rather than “as soon as practicable.”136  
Second, the amendments pushed back against the president’s ability to 
invoke an indefinite waiver on action against a designated CPC, replacing it 
with a maximum duration of 180 days.137 As noted above, nearly half of the 
currently designated CPCs are under multi-year presidential waivers that have 
shielded them from the imposition of any sanctions action. IRFA enabled this 
type of open-ended waiver because its original formulation failed to specify an 
expiration or time limit for presidential waivers.138 To this, the Wolf Act added 
a “sense of Congress” provision that explicitly condemned the presidential 
practice of “ongoing and persistent waivers” as not “fulfill[ing] the purposes” 
of IRFA.139 
Expanding on the above amendments targeting executive discretion, 
the original Wolf Act bill moved to strengthen USCIRF in several notable 
ways. First, it sought to reauthorize the Commission until 2021,140 a 
significantly lengthier period than afforded by prior Congressional reauthor-
izations. This push to secure an extended future for the bipartisan watchdog 
can be traced to Rep. Frank Wolf’s view that USCIRF, “unlike the State 
Department, is unencumbered by the impulse to maintain good bilateral 
relations above all else—an impulse which sadly can result in critical issues of 
religious freedom being sidelined in the pursuit of broader foreign policy 
goals.”141 From this vantage point, protecting USCIRF’s mandate would 
ensure that the State Department’s ability to conduct foreign policy would 
continue to be “irritated” by IRFA’s demand—as personified by the Comm-
																																								 																				
134 U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, ANNUAL REPORT 7–8 (2010). 
135 H.R. 1150, § 401–402. 
136 Id. at § 403. 
137 Compare § 407 with § 405 of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, Pub. L. 
No. 105-292, 112 Stat. 2787, 2787 (1998) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6445, 6647) (requiring 
the president to take action within 180 days at the maximum).  
138 International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-292, §407(a), 112 Stat. 
2787, 2787 (1998) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6401).  
139 Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act, H.R. 1150, 114th Cong. § 405 (2015). 
140 Id. at § 205. 
141 157 CONG. REC. 854 (2011) (statement of Rep. Frank R. Wolf). 
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ission—that religious freedom considerations inform the formulation and 
execution of that policy.142 Second, as if to drive home USCIRF’s role in 
constraining executive discretion, the Wolf Act also mandated that the 
president furnish an explanation in the event the executive branch ignored a 
USCIRF recommendation to designate a particular country as a CPC.143 
The final pair of original Wolf Act amendments worth noting signaled 
efforts to expand IRFA’s ability to sanction individuals for violations of 
religious freedom and to guarantee funding levels for religious freedom-
related activities. As noted above, IRFA’s original design provided for the 
imposition of sanctions against target countries for violations of religious 
freedom. But it also amended the Immigration and Nationality Act to require 
the State Department to deny entry to individual foreign government officials 
who were “responsible for or directly carried out . . . particularly severe vio-
lations of religious freedom.”144 The Wolf Act as introduced sought to 
enlarge this latter ability to penalize individuals. Under Section 605, the 
proposed bill enabled the president to sanction individuals responsible for 
engaging in or tolerating particularly severe violations of religious freedom. 
This power, premised on the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 
would be broadly applicable to any foreign person determined by the 
President to play “a role in committing, ordering, sponsoring, or materially 
																																								 																				
142 According to Rep. Smith, “Religious freedom has always been orphaned within the State 
Department . . . usually the Foreign Service officer tasked with religious freedom issues is 
someone very, very low on the totem poll and the Ambassador, the DCM [Deputy Chief of 
Mission] and others see it as an irritant.” Prioritizing International Religious Freedom in U.S. 
Foreign Policy, supra note 87, at 25. This view is corroborated by Thomas Farr: “the State 
Department views the Commission as an irritant. That it does not pay more than just lip service 
to many of its recommendations over the years . . . .” Id. at 80. 
143 H.R. 1150, §402. 
144 International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-292, §604(a), 112 Stat. 
2787, 2814 (1998) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6473(a)). In 2005, Narendra Modi, India’s current 
prime minister, became the first individual to be denied an entry visa under this provision of 
IRFA. The State Department denied Modi’s visa based on riots that occurred in 2002 during 
his tenure as head of Gujarat state and resulted in the death of over 1,000 Muslims. For 
coverage of this event, see Zahir Janmohamed, U.S. Evangelicals, Indian Expats Teamed Up 
to Push Through Modi Visa Ban, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2013), https://india.blogs.nytimes.com 
/2013/12/05/u-s-evangelicals-indian-expats-teamed-up-to-push-through-modi-visa-ban/; James 
Mann, Why Narendra Modi Was Banned From the U.S., WALL ST. J. (May 2, 2014, 4:26 
PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-narendra-modi-was-banned-from-the-u-s-1399062 
010. USCIRF renewed its call to deny Modi entry to the United States again in 2008, when 
he planned to participate in a conference celebrating Gujarati culture. Press Release, USCIRF, 
USCIRF Urges Denial of U.S. Visa to Gujarat Chief Minister Narendra Modi (Jul. 8, 2008), 
http://www.uscirf.gov/news-room/press-releases/uscirf-urges-denial-us-visa-gujarat-chief-
minister-narendra-modi [https://perma.cc/67WH-5CVW]. 
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supporting systemic, egregious, and ongoing violations of religious freedom” 
or who provides “material or other assistance supporting violence or terrorist 
acts targeting members of religious groups.”145 Further, it would enable the 
president to take a larger range of actions beyond denial of entry, including 
prohibiting financial transfers, and the acquisition, holding, or use of any 
property by a foreign national.146 
Finally, to undergird its effort to revitalize IRFA and place religious 
freedom at the center of U.S. foreign policy, the Wolf Act assigned explicit 
funding to the mission of promoting freedom of religion. Originally, IRFA 
merely amended the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 provision authorizing the 
president to use allocated funds to carry out “programs and activities which 
will encourage or promote increased adherence to civil and political rights” to 
include a reference to “the right to free religious belief and practice.”147 Under 
the changes proposed, “not less than 10 percent” of the amounts made available 
for 2016–2021 for the Human Rights and Democracy Fund (HRDF) would be 
designated for the specific “promotion of international religious freedom.”148 
This funding would be used for grants to groups pursuing legal protections for 
religious freedom; the promotion of cultural and societal understanding of 
international religious freedom norms; the reduction of religiously motivated 
and sectarian violence and extremism; and the reporting and monitoring of 
religious freedom violations.149 Further, an additional minimum two percent of 
HRDF money would be earmarked for a new fund dedicated to boosting 
religious freedom. The Religious Freedom Defense Fund, situated within the 
State Department and administered by the IRF Ambassador, would enable the 
issuing of grants to: 
																																								 																				
145 Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act, H.R. 1150, 114th Cong. § 601 
(Actions against persons responsible for committing particularly severe violations of 
international religious freedom) (as introduced in House, Feb. 27, 2015). 
146 International Emergency Economic Powers Act, Pub. L. 95-223, § 203, 91 Stat. 1625, 
1626–1627 (1977). 
147 22 U.S.C. § 2151(n)(e) (1999) (encouraging the president to use allocated funds “for 
studies to identify, and for openly carrying out programs and activities which will encourage 
or promote increased adherence to civil and political rights, including the right to free 
religious belief and practice, as set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights”). 
148 DRL Programs, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://www.state.gov/j/drl/p/ [https://perma.cc/ 
9XT7-9JF6] (last visited Dec. 31, 2018) (“The Human Rights and Democracy Fund (HRDF), 
established by Congress in 1998, functions as a ‘venture capital fund’ for democracy and 
human rights, enabling State to respond quickly and flexibly to changing needs and 
opportunities to advance democracy and promote human rights.”). See also Human Rights 
and Democracy Fund, 22 U.S.C § 2151(n)(2).  
149 H.R. 1150, § 501 (as introduced in House, Feb. 27, 2015). 
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• Victims of religious freedom abuses and their families to 
cover legal and other expenses that may arise from 
detention, imprisonment, torture, fines, and other 
restrictions; and  
• Projects to help create and support training of a new 
generation of defenders of religious freedom, including 
legal and political advocates, and civil society…150 
 
Despite Rep. Smith touting the Wolf Act’s “strong bipartisan 
support,”151 even at this early stage in the lawmaking process rumblings of 
opposition were apparent. Two months after its introduction, during 
subcommittee markup for the bill, Rep. David Cicilline (D-RI) communicated 
concerns expressed by the Obama administration regarding the Wolf Act’s 
proposed “changes to internal State Department structure,” “potential drains on 
democracy funding of other important programs,” and its reauthorization of 
USCIRF “without important reforms.”152 Rep. Cicilline’s expressed hope that 
these differences could be addressed “as this legislation moves forward” would 
set expectations for the next round of House negotiations.153 
 
B. Engrossed in House – May 2016 
 
If the attempt to extend IRFA’s mandate to NSA activity reflected one 
of the Wolf Act’s biggest innovations, precisely how this scrutiny would play 
out was subject to the biggest modifications before the full House extended its 
endorsement to the bill over a year later. First, the revised bill deleted the 
finding that 75 percent of the global population lives in countries where either 
the government or violent nonstate actors severely restrict the right to the 
freedom of religion and belief. More significantly, it overhauled the definition 
for nonstate actor to dramatically narrow the range of NSAs that could fall 
under IRFA scrutiny. Instead of using the ambiguous term “nonsovereign 
entity” the bill required that the NSA “not belong to or ally itself to any 
particular country.”154 Further, it required that an NSA exercise significant 
																																								 																				
150 Id. 
151 H.R. Rep. No. 114-62 (2015) (Comm. Markup) (according to Rep. Smith: “Some 10 
Democrats have signed on as cosponsors of the bill, and the lead cosponsor of the bill is Anna 
Eshoo . . . We have 80 total sponsors of the bill and the number is growing by the day.”) 
152 Id. 
153 Id.  
154 Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act, H.R. 1150, 114th Cong. § 3 (defi-
nitions) (as engrossed in House, May 16, 2016) (noting House suspended rules and passed bill 
by voice vote).  
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political power and (rather than “or”) the ability to exert influence. Finally, the 
new version required that an NSA “often employ[] illegal violence in pursuit 
of its objectives.”155 These changes effectively rejected the original bill’s more 
flexible, if vague, language capturing a wider swath of NSAs based on 
“financ[ing] or tolerat[ing] violations of religious freedom . . . or discrimination 
targeting religious minorities.”156 In other words, under the new formulation, 
NSAs aiding or tolerating violations or discrimination impacting freedom of 
religion or belief but otherwise avoiding violence would no longer be subject 
to scrutiny under IRFA. Further, even if an NSA met the higher “illegal 
violence” criteria, it would still need to satisfy the definitional tests concerning 
“significant political power,” national or international influence, and 
independence to fall under IRFA. 
Beyond narrowing the operative definition of NSAs that would trigger 
IRFA scrutiny, the revised bill also deleted the entire “Statement of Policy 
Regarding Country of Particular Concern Designation For Violent Nonstate 
Actors.” In doing so, the bill undid the requirement for mandatory presidential 
action where an NSA was found to have “engaged in or tolerated violations of 
religious freedom.”157 Whereas the original House bill required the president to 
act using the full range of sanctions available under IRFA, the revised bill 
introduced two significant changes. First, it premised presidential action on a 
higher threshold, paralleling the standard applicable to CPCs. Accordingly, 
before executive action could be directed against an NSA, it would have to be 
found to “have engaged in particularly severe violations of religious freedom”158 
and designated an “Entity of Particular Concern” (EPC)159 by the president.  
																																								 																				
155 Id.  
156 Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act, H.R. 1150, 114th Cong. § 3 (definitions) 
(as introduced in House, Feb. 27, 2015). 
157 Id. at § 401(Presidential actions in response to violations of religious freedom). 
158 H.R. 1150, § 301 (Non-State Actor Designations) (as engrossed in House, May 16, 2016). 
159 Id. This is not the first time the term “entities of particular concern” would appear in 
IRFA. The original law employs the term in connection with the requirement to publish IRFA 
determinations in the Federal Register. Under the heading “Determinations of Governments, 
Officials, and Entities of Particular Concern,” the president is obligated to publish in the 
Federal Register “[a]ny designation of a country of particular concern for religious freedom 
. . . together with, when applicable and to the extent practicable, the identities of the officials 
or entities determined to be responsible for the violations.” International Religious Freedom 
Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-292, §408(a)(1), 112 Stat. 2787, 2808 (1998) (codified at 22 
U.S.C. § 6448). An EPC designation under the House-revised bill maintains a parallel 
presidential obligation to “seek to determine the specific officials or members thereof that 
are responsible for the particularly severe violations of religious freedom.” H.R. 1150, § 301 
(Non-State Actor Designations) (as engrossed in House, May 16, 2016). 
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At the same time, the revised bill retreated from mandating the 
president to take statutorily-defined action. Instead, it merely suggested that 
the “President should take specific actions to address severe violations of 
religious freedom” by EPCs, “including taking actions commensurate to” those 
already designated under IRFA.160 Thus, while the revised bill signaled a 
laudable effort to integrate a new EPC designation alongside the preexisting 
CPC regime, it left the actual post-designation treatment of EPCs adrift. Rather 
than transpose CPC provisions governing mandatory action based on a preset 
menu of options, the bill discarded requirements for such action as well as the 
need to do so within a fixed timeframe. 
Perhaps to compensate for discarding deadlines and mandatory action 
against NSAs, the House-revised Wolf Act added a new “sense of Congress” 
provision recommending the Secretary of State work with Congress to “create 
new political, financial, and diplomatic tools to address severe violations of 
religious freedom by non-state actors” and to “update the actions the President 
can take” under these EPC scenarios in IRFA.161 It also newly required the 
President furnish Congress with a “report detailing the reasons”162 for any EPC 
designation, that the Annual IRF Report’s executive summary include any 
country within which an EPC is located,163 and further, that any designation of 
an EPC be published in the Federal Register.164 
The downgraded emphasis on addressing NSAs violating religious 
freedom is similarly evident in revisions to the Special Watch List proposal. 
The Watch List was originally conceived to establish a new tier system under 
IRFA for reporting on religious freedom violations. The House-approved bill, 
however, rejected inclusion of NSAs on the Watch List. Thus, it signaled that 
only countries tolerating serious violations of religious freedom falling short of 
the CPC standard would be eligible for inclusion on the list.165 In addition to 
scrapping the possibility of using this tool to place NSAs on notice for religious 
																																								 																				
160 H.R. 1150, §301 (Non-state Actor Designations) (as engrossed in House, May 16, 2016) 
(emphasis added). 
161 Id. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. at § 102 (Annual Report on International Religious Freedom). 
164 Id. at § 305. The Federal Register published the first set of EPC designations in March 
2018. Secretary of State’s Determination Under the Frank R. Wolf International Religious 
Freedom Act of 2016, 83 Fed. Reg. 10545 (Mar. 8, 2018) (designating as EPCs the following 
NSAs: al-Nusra Front, al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula, al-Qa’ida, al-Shabab, Boko 
Haram, ISIS, ISIS-Khorasan, and the Taliban). 
165 Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act, H.R. 1150, 114th Cong. § 102 
(Annual Report on International Religious Freedom) (as engrossed in House, May 16, 2016). 
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freedom violations falling short of the “particularly severe” standard, deleting 
NSAs from the watch-list also meant that such entities would no longer be 
subject to automatic EPC status if they appeared on the list in more than two 
consecutive IRF annual reports.166 Additional amendments impacting the 
Watch List provision also resulted in limiting an automatic CPC designation 
only to those countries appearing on the list in “more than two consecutive 
Annual Reports.”167 
One exception to the revised bill’s rollback of provisions targeting NSAs 
can be seen in the decision to retain the proposal to create and maintain a list of 
victims harmed for their religious activity or religious freedom advocacy. By 
preserving this provision, the House saved USCIRF’s new mandate to report on 
individuals detained, disappeared or otherwise targeted by a “non-state actor that 
the Commission recommends for designation as an entity of particular concern 
for religious freedom.”168 Still, USCIRF would need to show that any listed NSA 
satisfied the more rigorous EPC standard established under the House version 
before it could add any impacted individual to the victims list.  
Additional modifications that occurred at this stage of the legislative 
process are equally significant because they signal a wider downgrading of the 
tenor and thrust of the IRFA amendments as originally proposed. For example, 
the bill approved by the House deleted major enhancements intended to boost 
the status and function of the Ambassador at Large for Religious Freedom (IRF) 
and the Office on International Religious Freedom (OIRF). Although the House-
approved bill opted to preserve the IRF Ambassador’s new direct reporting line 
to the Secretary of State, it discarded the relocation requirement, preferring to 
keep OIRF within the State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, 
and Labor. In place of this relocation, the engrossed bill substituted a nonbinding 
“sense of Congress” provision calling on the Secretary of State merely to 
“consider elevating” OIRF and the IRF Ambassador “to the Office of the 
Secretary, similar to other Ambassador-at-Large positions that now report 
																																								 																				
166 Id. at § 302 (listing presidential actions in response to particularly severe violations of 
religious freedom). 
167 Id. 
168 Id. at § 104 (including prisoner lists and issue briefs on religious freedom concerns). Although 
the House-revised bill retained the new prisoner list provision, it simultaneously discarded the 
original bill’s attempt to make it “be the policy of the United States Government”—rather than 
IRFA’s existing “sense of Congress”—that “all officials . . . shall promote” increased advocacy 
on such issues during meetings with foreign dignitaries. Compare Frank R. Wolf International 
Religious Freedom Act, H.R. 1150, 114th Cong. § 104 (providing prisoner lists and issue briefs 
on religious freedom concerns), as Introduced in House, Feb. 27, 2015 and Frank R. Wolf 
International Religious Freedom Act, H.R. 1150, 114th Cong. § 104 (including prisoner lists and 
issue briefs on religious freedom concerns), as Engrossed in House, May 16, 2016. 
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directly to the Secretary.”169 Equally revealing, the bill deleted the provision that 
would have elevated the ambassador’s status to “the principal advisor” to the 
president regarding matters affecting religious freedom abroad, permitting this 
jump in status only with respect to advising the Secretary of State.170 
Coupled with the decision to eschew upgrading the organizational 
status of OIRF and the IRF Ambassador, the House-approved bill also clawed 
back the ambassador’s new responsibilities for integrating IRF policy. Instead 
of robust and defined duties extending into the work of various federal 
departments and agencies, the House-approved version called generally for 
“integrat[ing] United States international religious freedom policies and 
strategies into the foreign policy efforts of the United States.”171 While this 
change might appear cosmetic in nature, the lack of specificity may make 
future integration efforts more difficult and subject to administrative 
impediments. Perhaps as a token to soften these blows, the House-approved 
bill promised to enlarge OIRF staffing from the originally proposed 20 to 25 
full-time staff. Still, this change came at the expense of deleting the require-
ment that OIRF include a senior director and downgrading the language on 
representation funds from “levels at least equal to” to “in amounts comparable 
to those provided to other Ambassadors.”172 
Further illustrating the overall downgrading of the proposed IRFA 
amendments, the House-approved bill rejected provisions intended to boost 
religious freedom advocacy within the National Security Council (NSC). First, 
the House scrapped the requirement that the president appoint a “Special Adviser 
for Global Religion Engagement and International Religious Freedom” to the 
NSC.173 In place of mandating this appointment, the House-approved bill simply 
																																								 																				
169 H.R. 1150, § 101 (Office on International Religious Freedom; Ambassador at Large for 
International Religious Freedom) (as engrossed in House, May 16, 2016). For example, see 
Bureaus/Offices Reporting Directly to the Secretary, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://www.state. 
gov/s/index.htm [https://perma.cc/G29P-AHGA] (last visited Dec. 31, 2018) and Special Envoys, 
Representatives, Coordinators, AM. FOREIGN SERVICE ASS’N, http://www.afsa.org/special-
envoys-representatives-and-coordinators [https://perma.cc/N27N-U33K] (last visited Nov. 20, 
2018). Note that the number of these special representatives is poised to drop. Colum Lynch & 
Robbie Gramer, State Department Reorganization Eliminates Climate, Muslim and Syria Envoys, 
FOR. POL. (Aug. 29, 2017), https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/08/29/state-department-reorgani 
zation-eliminates-climate-muslim-and-syria-envoys/ [https://perma.cc/GFW4-YJ65]. 
170 H.R. 1150, § 101 (Office on International Religious Freedom; Ambassador at Large for 
International Religious Freedom) (as engrossed in House, May 16, 2016). 
171 Id. 
172 Compare with H.R. 1150, § 101 (Office on International Religious Freedom; Ambassador 
at Large for International Religious Freedom) (as engrossed in House, May 16, 2016). 
173 H.R. 1150, § 301 (Special Adviser for Global Religion Engagement and International Reli-
gious Freedom; Interagency Policy Committees) (as introduced in House, Feb. 27, 2015) (noting 
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reverted to IRFA’s original “sense of Congress” formulation recommending 
appointment of a “Special Adviser to the President on International Religious 
Freedom.” At the same time, it expanded slightly on IRFA’s originally 
envisioned role for the NSC adviser by, for example, suggesting the position 
include assisting the IRF Ambassador “to coordinate international religious 
freedom policies and strategies throughout the executive branch.”174  
Second, the House-approved bill also discarded the provision that 
sought to establish two new NSC-based interagency policy committees—one 
on “International Religious Freedom and Global Religion Engagement” and 
another on “Religion, International Religious Freedom, and National 
Security.” Taken together, these revisions effectively ended efforts to secure 
a reinvigorated role for religious freedom within the NSC. At the same time, 
they served to diminish the elevated status afforded to the IRF Ambassador 
under the original bill.175 As if to cement the rejection of a more central 
policy-making role for the IRF Ambassador within the NSC, the House’s 
revised bill tepidly added (as part of the mandate holder’s new coordination 
duties) that the ambassador “should participate in any interagency processes 
on issues in which the promotion of international religious freedom policy 
can advance United States national security interests, including in democracy 
promotion, stability, security, and development globally.”176  
The House approved bill also undid efforts to enhance IRFA’s 
sanctioning ability and to secure financing to promote religious freedom. In place 
of the original bill’s explicit grant of authority to sanction individuals violating 
religious freedom, the House directed the Secretary of State simply to establish 
and maintain a “Designated Persons List” of foreign individuals who are 
sanctioned, through visa denials, financial sanctions, or other measures, because 
																																								 																				
that the special adviser would “coordinate international religious freedom policies and global 
religion engagement strategies . . . and develop policy recommendations.”). 
174 Compare International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-292, § 301, 112 
Stat. 2787, 2800 (1998) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6436) (Special Adviser on International 
Religious Freedom) with Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act, H.R. 1150, 
114th Cong. § 201 (Special Adviser for International Religious Freedom) (as engrossed in 
House, May 16, 2016). 
175 Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act, H.R. 1150, 114th Cong § 301 
(Special Adviser for Global Religion Engagement and International Religious Freedom; 
Interagency Policy Committees) (as introduced in House, Feb. 27, 2015). The original bill 
tasked the former committee (chaired by the IRF Ambassador) with developing “a global 
strategy to advance international religious freedom”, and the latter committee (co-chaired by 
the IRF Ambassador and Deputy National Security Advisor) with identifying “potential 
national security risks related to the absence of religious freedom globally.” Id. 
176 H.R. 1150, § 101 (Office on International Religious Freedom; Ambassador at Large for 
International Religious Freedom) (as engrossed in House, May 16, 2016). 
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of their responsibility for “ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing 
particularly severe violations of freedom [sic] religion.”177 As part of this 
obligation, the Secretary would provide Congress with regular updates to the list, 
including a “description of the actions taken . . . in response to” those individual 
included therein.178 In this case, negotiation and passage of the Global 
Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act provides a likely explanation for 
the decision to delete the express ability to impose sanctions on individual 
government officials for violations of religious freedom under IRFA.179 
Coupled with this, the House retreated from mandating minimum 
funding for the protection and advancement of international religious 
freedom through the State Department’s Human Rights and Democracy Fund 
and the Religious Freedom Defense Fund. Rather than preserve the State 
Department’s obligation to fund religious freedom promotion activities at 
guaranteed levels, the approved bill opted instead to express a nonbinding 
“sense of Congress” that funding ought to be pegged at such levels.180  
Finally, the House took aim at provisions intended to fortify USCIRF 
and to reduce executive discretion. In the first instance, it discarded all 
provisions of the original H.R. 1150 bill directed at reforming USCIRF, 
including its reauthorization until 2021.181 At the same time, it further undercut 
the Commission’s stature (and the effort to reign in executive discretion) by 
deleting the proposal requiring the president to explain any decision to forgo a 
CPC designation where USCIRF had made a prior recommendation supporting 
such a designation.182 Similarly, the House approved bill rejected at least some 
																																								 																				
177 Id. at § 501 (Designated Persons List for Particularly Severe Violations of Religious 
Freedom). 
178 Id. 
179 The Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act enables the president to impose 
sanctions “based on credible evidence” that a foreign person is “responsible for extrajudicial 
killings, torture, or other gross violations of internationally recognized human rights 
committed against individuals in any foreign country who seek . . . to obtain, exercise, 
defend, or promote internationally recognized human rights and freedoms, such as the 
freedoms of religion . . .” Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act, Pub. L. 114-
328, § 1263, 130 Stat. 2533 (2016) (codified at 23 U.S.C. § 2656) (Authorization of 
Imposition of Sanctions). 
180 Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act, H.R. 1150, 114th Cong. § 401 
(Assistance for Promoting Religious Freedom) (as engrossed in House, May 16, 2016). 
181 The House approved version of H.R. 1150 entirely deleted Title II of the bill as introduced, 
the section that addressed reform and reauthorization of the Commission. 
182 Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act of 2015, H.R. 1150, 114th Cong.  
§ 402 (Presidential actions in response to particularly severe violations of religious freedom) 
(as introduced in House, Feb. 27, 2015). As noted, this obligation to explain non-designation 
would represent a check on executive discretion. 
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of the amendments proposed in 2015 that intended to impose stricter deadlines 
for action and limits on the duration of presidential waivers. For example, the 
new bill eliminated amendments imposing 90-day deadlines for the president 
to act in response to countries violating religious freedom (though not in a 
particularly severe manner) and to engage in consultations with those countries 
subject to such action under section 401 of IRFA. Perhaps more significantly, 
rather than endorse the suggested 180-day limit on such CPC waivers,183 the 
new bill restored the president’s authority to seek an indefinite waiver after 
expiry of an initial 180-day waiver period. The president could activate this 
second waiver “for any additional period of time after the 180-day period” by 
providing a determination that the “respective foreign government has ceased 
the [relevant] violations” or “the exercise of such authority is important to the 
national interests of the United States.”184 Perhaps to offset the return of an 
indefinite waiver, the approved House bill preserved a “sense of Congress” 
provision asserting that “ongoing and persistent waivers of the application of 
[sanction actions under IRFA §405(a) ¶ 9-15] do not fulfill the purposes of this 
Act”, and reasoning that “because the promotion of religious freedom is a 
compelling interest of United States foreign policy, the President [and others] 
should seek to find ways to address existing violations, on a case-by-case basis, 
through the actions specified in [IRFA § 405].”185 
From the analysis above, the House-approved version of the Wolf Act 
resulted in significant revisions to diminish the scrutiny of NSAs and undo 
other major efforts to boost IRFA’s effectiveness and centrality in U.S. 
foreign policy. Still, it retained some positive amendments and introduced at 
least one critical improvement. First, the bill preserved most of the provisions 
setting out new mandatory training requirements for the State Department. It 
did opt to downgrade the obligation to share training materials with a detailed 
list of federal departments and agencies in favor of a suggestion the materials 
should be made available to all other Federal agencies. However, the only 
other changes to this amendment related to minor revisions to language. 
Second, the House-approved bill preserved some of the efforts to hold the 
president to a more defined time table with respect to reporting on CPCs. For 
example, it preserved the call for 90-day time limits on presidential review 
and determination of CPCs and on reporting to Congress action flowing from 
																																								 																				
183 H.R. 1150, § 405 (Presidential Waiver) (as introduced in House, Feb. 27, 2015) 
184 H.R. 1150, § 304 (Presidential Waiver) (as engrossed in House, May 16, 2016). 
185 Compare H.R. 1150, § 405 (Presidential Waiver) (as introduced in House, Feb. 27, 2015) 
with International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, H.R. 1150, 114th Cong. §304 (Pres-
idential Waiver) (as engrossed in House, May 16, 2016). 
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such designations.186 Third, the House maintained the “sense of Congress” 
provision calling on the president’s annual national security strategy report 
to “promote international religious freedom as a foreign policy and national 
security priority.”187 Finally, the House-approved bill also endorsed the new 
Victims List amendment, making only slight changes to accommodate the 
shift away from violent NSAs to the newly introduced EPC system. 
Perhaps the most notable improvement to the original bill related to a 
revision of IRFA’s definition of the right to freedom of thought, conscience  
and religion. The edits introduced in the House-approved bill expressly 
recognized that this right includes protection of “theistic and non-theistic 
beliefs as well as the right not to profess or practice any religion.”188 This 
finding is further strengthened elsewhere in the bill by acknowledging that “the 
specific targeting of non-theists, humanists, and atheists . . . [is often 
particularly widespread, systematic, and heinous] . . . in regions where non-
state actors exercise significant political power and influence.”189 Incorpor-
ating this revision represented no small achievement. According to the 
American Humanist Association, the four-year effort to “include inclusive 
language protecting non-believers,” signaled “a significant step toward full 
acceptance and inclusion for non-religious individuals.”190 The move also 
served to bring IRFA more closely into line with the international 
understanding of the scope of freedom of religion or belief. According to the 
UN Human Rights Committee, the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion “protects theistic, non- theistic and atheistic beliefs, as well as the right 
not to profess any religion or belief. The terms “belief” and “religion” are to be 
																																								 																				
186 See Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act of 2015, H.R. 1150, 114th Cong. 
§402 (Presidential actions in response to particularly severe violations of religious freedom) 
(as introduced in House, Feb. 27, 2015); see also Frank R. Wolf International Religious 
Freedom Act, H.R. 1150, 114th Cong. §302 (Presidential actions in response to particularly 
severe violations of religious freedom) (as engrossed in House, May 16, 2016). The original 
version of IRFA offered little in the way of clear deadlines, appearing to provide the president 
with a year to review country status and make determinations, and similarly, requiring only 
that the president notify congress “as soon as practicable after the designation is made.” H.R. 
1150, §402(b) (Presidential actions in response to particularly severe violations of religious 
freedom) (as introduced in House, Feb. 27, 2015. 
187 H.R. 1150, § 703 (Sense of congress regarding national security strategy to promote 
religious freedom through United States foreign policy) (as engrossed in House, May 16, 
2016). 
188 H.R. 1150, § 2 (Findings; Policy) (as engrossed in House, May 16, 2016). 
189 Id.  
190 Obama Signs Modified Religious Freedom Law, AMS. UNITED FOR SEPARATION OF CHURCH 
& STATE (Feb. 2017), https://www.au.org/church-state/february-2017-church-state/au-bulletin/ 
obama-signs-modified-religious-freedom-law [https://perma.cc/ST4L-HR5A].  
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broadly construed.”191 Among other things, this means that the freedom to 
“have or to adopt” a religion or belief “necessarily entails the freedom to choose 
a religion or belief, including the right to replace one’s current religion or belief 
with another or to adopt atheistic views.”192 
 
C. Senate Revisions – December 2016 
 
After gaining the House’s approval, the Wolf Act proceeded to 
deliberations in the Senate. These negotiations, ultimately leading to a version 
of the bill approved in December 2016, brought about further revisions to the 
House approved text discussed above. Here again, much of the focus for 
changes revolved around how to implement the new system for monitoring 
NSA-based violations of religious freedom. On one hand, the Senate preserved 
the review, designation and reporting regime193 for EPCs, the inclusion of 
EPCs in the IRF annual report executive summary,194 and the provisions 
relating to USCIRF preparing and maintaining a list of victims of EPCs.195 On 
the other hand, despite these carryovers, the Senate took steps to further limit 
the potential impact of IRFA’s new NSA-related provisions. 
For example, the Senate moved to further narrow the Wolf Act’s 
operative definition for NSAs. To this end, it preserved the requirements of 
significant political power, independence from states, and the employment of 
violence in pursuit of its objectives.196 But, it also now required that NSAs 
exercise territorial control rather than “exert influence at a national or intern-
ational level.” Though the addition of territorial control arguably lent greater 
clarity to the NSA definition than the vague notion of “exert influence”, it still 
left much open to interpretation. For example, how much territory is required, 
and for how long a duration must it be “controlled”? From this perspective, any 
clarity gained by the change likely will come at the expense of further reducing 
the number of NSAs potentially eligible for consideration under IRFA. 
The Senate’s revisions also included two significant changes to further 
lessen the likelihood and consistency of presidential action against an NSA 
designated as an EPC. First, the Senate bill entrenched the House language 
																																								 																				
191 Human Rights Committee, General Comment on Freedom of Thought, Conscience and 
Religion, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4, at ¶ 2, (1993). 
192 Id. at ¶ 5. 
193 Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act, H.R. 1150, 114th Cong. §301 (Non-
state Actor Designations) (as engrossed in Senate, Dec. 10, 2016). 
194 Id. at § 102 (Annual Report on International Religious Freedom). 
195 Id. at § 104 (Prisoner Lists and Issue Briefs on Religious Freedom Concerns). 
196 Id. at § 3 (Definitions) (as engrossed in Senate, Dec. 10, 2016). 
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scrapping the requirement of presidential action against EPCs. In particular, it 
provided that the “President should take specific actions, when practicable, to 
address [EPC] violations of religious freedom.”197 With this modification, the 
Senate endorsed the House decision to downgrade presidential action from 
mandatory to optional (“shall take” to “should take”), and further enabled the 
president to waive off taking any EPC-targeted action in the event he or she 
deemed it “impracticable.” Coupled with this, the Senate also did away with 
requiring presidential action targeting EPCs to be based on a pre-approved 
inventory of sanctions already provided under IRFA § 405. In doing so, the 
Senate left as open-ended—and thus unpredictable—the potential types of 
executive action the president might take. Viewed in their entirety, these 
revisions appeared to further expand presidential discretion and make the 
likelihood of any EPC action even more remote. 
Perhaps to counterbalance the additional attrition to IRFA’s new NSA 
provisions, the Senate preserved the “sense of Congress” that the Secretary 
of State should work “to create new political, financial, and diplomatic tools” 
to deal with violations of religious freedom committed by NSAs. To this, it 
added a new provision recommending that any presidential action targeting 
an EPC “should also involve high-level diplomacy with the government of 
the country in which the non-state actor is operating.”198 Presumably, this 
diplomatic engagement might serve to generate an impact on or consequence 
for the EPC without the need for direct U.S. action. 
Looking beyond the Senate’s NSA/EPC-related changes, the new bill 
continued the retreat away from the vision set out in the original Wolf Act by 
declining to support additional House-approved amendments intended to 
strengthen IRFA. While the Senate endorsed the 90-day reporting deadlines 
introduced in the House version, it deleted the provision requiring countries 
appearing on the newly created Special Watch List for two consecutive years 
to be automatically designated as CPCs. Therefore, moving forward, these 
countries could be placed on the Watch List and remain there indefinitely.199 
What implications this may have in practice remain to be seen. However, by 
removing the provision, the Senate rejected at least part of the rationale for 
establishing a second tier of scrutiny under IRFA. Without the automatic CPC 
escalation after two years, countries on the Special Watch List arguably are 
																																								 																				
197 Id. at § 301 (Non-State Actor Designations) (as engrossed in Senate, Dec. 10, 2016) 
(emphasis added).  
198 Id. 
199 Compare Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act, H.R. 1150, 114th Cong. § 
302 (Presidential actions in response to particularly severe violations of religious freedom) (as 
engrossed in Senate, Dec. 10, 2016) with Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act, 
H.R. 1150, 114th Cong. at § 302 (Presidential actions in response to particularly severe 
violations of religious freedom) (as engrossed in House, May 16, 2016). 
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being put on notice that nothing in particular may happen to their status or 
standing with the United States in the face of violations of religious freedom 
that fall below the threshold of “particularly severe.” 
The Senate also took aim at the IRF Ambassador and IRF Office, 
further undercutting efforts to boost the role and stature of these institutional 
actors. The Senate version deleted the nonbinding “sense of Congress” 
provision recommending that the IRF Ambassador and IRF office be elevated 
“to the Office of the Secretary, similar to other Ambassador at Large 
positions.”200 At the same time, it rejected provisions designed to secure the 
IRF Office’s operational capacity. Specifically, it replaced the explicit House 
requirement that OIRF have “at least 25 full-time equivalent staff positions”201 
with a far vaguer commitment of “appropriate staff for the Office, including 
full-time equivalent positions.”202 To soften this blow, a new “sense of 
Congress” provision was added to the effect “that maintaining an adequate 
staffing level at the Office, such as was in place during fiscal year 2016, is 
necessary for the Office to carry out its important work.”203  
Further weakening the institutional actors advocating for religious 
freedom within the U.S. foreign policy-making process, the Senate diluted 
what remained of the envisioned NSC special adviser on IRF. The revised 
Senate bill deleted the House-backed “sense of Congress” provision that 
communicated an explicit, enlarged status for the special adviser position, 
including the responsibility for making policy recommendations. Instead, the 
Senate provision simply explained—albeit removing the nonbinding “sense of 
Congress” formulation—that the advisor (if appointed) would “assist the 
Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom to coordinate 
international religious freedom policies and strategies.”204 
																																								 																				
200 Compare H.R. 1150, §101 (Office on International Religious Freedom; Ambassador at 
Large for International Religious Freedom) (as engrossed in House, May 16, 2016) with H.R. 
1150, § 101 (Office on International Religious Freedom; Ambassador at Large for 
International Religious Freedom) (as engrossed in Senate, Dec. 10, 2016). 
201 H.R. 1150, § 101 (Office on International Religious Freedom; Ambassador at Large for 
International Religious Freedom) (as engrossed in House, May 16, 2016). 
202 H.R. 1150, § 101(a)(3) (Office of International Religious Freedom; Ambassador at Large 
for International Religious Freedom) (as engrossed in Senate, Dec. 10, 2016) (emphasis 
added). This arguably is an improvement on the original IRFA language which provided that 
“[t]he Secretary of State shall provide the Ambassador at Large with such funds as may be 
necessary for the hiring of staff for the Office, for the conduct of investigations by the Office, 
and for necessary travel to carry out the provisions of this section.” Id.  
203 Id. 
204 Compare H.R. 1150, §201 (Special Adviser for International Religious Freedom) (as 
engrossed in Senate, Dec. 10, 2016) with H.R. 1150, § 201 (Special Adviser for International 
Religious Freedom) (as engrossed in House, May 16, 2016).  
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The Senate also introduced subtle changes to the provisions governing 
mandatory training of State Department personnel and the funding of religious 
freedom promotion activities. With respect to training, the Senate bill appeared 
to preserve its mandatory nature, as well as the one-year time frame for 
initiating a curriculum, the personnel required to participate, and the specific 
courses that would incorporate religious freedom training. However, it 
modified House language directing that the National Foreign Affairs Training 
Center “shall begin mandatory training on religious freedom for all Foreign 
Service officers . . . .” Instead, it provided that the training center “conduct 
training on religious freedom for all Foreign Service officers . . . .”205 Further, 
it deleted language specifying that training “be a separate, independent, and 
required segment” of the courses designated.  
The Senate also transferred the obligation to develop a training 
curriculum from the Secretary of State to the IRF ambassador, directing that 
the ambassador “shall make recommendations to the Secretary of State 
regarding a curriculum for the training of United States Foreign Service 
officers.”206 In addition, the new bill restored previously deleted language 
regarding the sharing of training materials. Rather than merely suggest that 
the “curriculum and training materials developed . . . should be made avail-
able to all other Federal Agencies,” the Senate version reverted to a more 
mandatory and detailed formulation. Borrowing from the bill as originally 
introduced, it provided that the curriculum and materials “shall be shared with 
the United States Armed Forces and other Federal departments and agencies 
with personnel who are stationed overseas, as appropriate.”207 
With respect to funding activities promoting international religious 
freedom, the Senate opted to preserve the provision’s noncompulsory “sense 
of Congress” formulation. However, it modified the House proposal suggest-
ing the “Department of State should make available” minimum amounts from 
the Human Rights and Democracy Fund for such activities and for the 
establishment of a Religious Freedom Defense Fund. Instead, it recommended 
that the “President should request sufficient appropriations from Congress to 
support” these activities.208  
Despite the numerous modifications reducing the overall scope of the 
draft Wolf Act, the Senate still retained several key proposed amendments 
contained in the House version. First, it left intact the provisions governing the 
																																								 																				
205 Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act, H.R. 1150, 114th Cong. §103 
(Training for foreign service officers) (as engrossed in Senate, Dec. 10, 2016). 
206 Id.  
207 Id. The provision also detailed several specific religious freedom-related issues that would 
be relevant across these departments and agencies. 
208 Id. at § 401 (Assistance for Promoting Religious Freedom). 
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new Designated Persons List for Particularly Severe Violations of Religious 
Freedom, only making changes focused on streamlining language. It preserved 
the obligation for the Secretary of State to maintain and update the list, as well 
as the requirement to provide Congress with reports on updates to the list every 
180 days. The preservation of this list in the draft bill signaled the possibility 
for a more active but tailored use of targeted action intended to punish 
individuals responsible for particularly severe violations of freedom of 
religion.209 Additionally, this reporting requirement holds the potential for 
providing Congress with a new tool for measuring how seriously the State 
Department is taking its obligation to protect and promote religious freedom. 
In addition, the Senate maintained the “sense of Congress” provision 
suggesting that the president’s annual national security strategy report should 
“promote international religious freedom as a foreign policy and national 
security priority” in part because it “protects other, related human rights, and 
advances democracy outside the United States.”210 This provision traced back 
to H.R. 1150 as originally introduced nearly two years earlier.  
The Senate also preserved new House language incorporating explicit 
protection for theistic and non-theistic views under the umbrella of freedom of 
religion or belief. In addition, it retained the creation of a Victims List to be 
maintained by USCIRF. According to this provision, the Commission would 
publicize a list of individual victims harmed by governments and NSAs 
USCIRF has recommended for CPC and EPC designation respectively.  
The most notable addition provided in the Senate version of the Wolf 
Act came in the form of a new finding that a “policy or practice of routinely 
denying applications for visas for religious workers in a country can be 
indicative of a poor state of religious freedom in that country.”211 This finding 
was supplemented by a new “sense of Congress” statement recommending that 
the “United States Government should seek to reverse any such policy by 
reviewing the entirety of the bilateral relationship between such country and 
the United States.”212 
 
D. Public Law 114-281: Outcome of Congressional Negotiations 
 
Shortly after the dust of negotiations in Congress settled, President 
Obama signed the Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act, 
enacting the most extensive changes to IRFA since its inception nearly two 
																																								 																				
209 Id. at § 501 (Designated Persons List for Particularly Severe Violations of Religious Freedom). 
210 Id. at § 703 (Sense of Congress Regarding National Security Strategy to Promote Relig-
ious Freedom Through United States Foreign Policy). 
211 Id. at § 2 (Findings, Policy, Sense of Congress). 
212 Id.  
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decades earlier. Although the final law fell far short of its original vision, it did 
pick up a handful of improvements along the way. Most notably, while the 
provisions governing the ability of IRFA to scrutinize NSAs benefitted from 
significant clarification, they were also subject to much claw back and 
attenuation. Representatives Ed Royce and Chris Smith initially lauded the 
proposed IRFA amendments for targeting groups that “have turned religious 
intolerance into a murderous force of global instability”213 and were responsible 
for “some of the most egregious religious freedom violations.”214 But by the 
time the Senate completed its revisions, much of the thunder behind the sought-
after ability to identify and sanction NSAs—including the requirement that the 
president take defined actions against EPCs and the inclusion of NSAs on the 
new Special Watch List—had either been significantly diminished or altogether 
deleted from the bill. The provisions that remain are likely to generate 
interpretational confusion and conflict that risk further clouding the 
effectiveness and consistency of any EPC outcomes. These ambiguities impact 
many obvious but decisive questions. For example, when does an NSA exert 
“significant” political power? What amount of territorial control is necessary? 
What degree of independence is sufficient to demonstrate autonomy from a 
sovereign government? How much violence must an NSA exert, and relatedly, 
what NSA actions will rise to the level of “severe” for an EPC designation? 
Finally, what guidance ought to apply concerning the design of any presidential 
actions to be taken against any designated EPCs? 
Examining the final Wolf Act more generally betrays the same 
overarching tendency to delete or otherwise reduce the potential effectiveness 
of the various provisions originally proposed. As noted above, the effort to 
place a cap on the duration of the president’s ability to waive mandatory action 
against CPCs did not make it into the final law. Failing to secure this 
amendment likely will perpetuate chronic CPC-designated states continuing to 
remain under an indefinite waiver based on “important national interest.” 
Related to this, Congress undid other efforts to place a check on executive 
discretion. For example, by rejecting provisions intended to secure USCIRF’s 
extended reauthorization and requiring the president to explain any decision to 
forgo a CPC designation where USCIRF had made a prior recommendation, 
the final Wolf Act declined to scale back the executive discretion that has come 
to define IRFA over its twenty years of implementation. 
Similarly, Congress dismantled proposals intended to better integrate 
religious freedom into U.S. foreign policy. It rejected requiring the president 
to appoint an NSC adviser on international religious freedom and the creation 
of two new NSC interagency committees that would have provided a central 
																																								 																				
213 CONG. REC. H2399, H2403 (May 16, 2016) (statement of Rep. Royce). 
214 CONG. REC. H7580, H7584 (Dec. 13, 2016) (statement of Rep. Smith). 
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policy-input role for the IRF Ambassador. Given IRFA’s history, it is 
unlikely that such an NSC appointment will occur without more than a “sense 
of Congress” recommendation supporting it. Coupled with this, Congress 
also rejected the small but telling proposal to upgrade the IRF ambassador’s 
role from “a” principal advisor to “the” principal advisor to the president on 
religious freedom issues.  
Further undercutting IRFA’s institutional structures, Congress eschew-
ed relocating the IRF office and ambassador to the Office of the Secretary of 
State. So powerful was the unwillingness to situate the IRF office within the 
Office of the Secretary, that the Senate even struck the House’s proposed 
solution, which simply relegated the OIRF move to a nonbinding “sense of 
Congress” recommendation. The Senate’s deletion of this compromise 
provision was made even starker by the fact that it simultaneously rejected the 
House’s justification for the move. According to the House, the relocation 
would “demonstrate both the strategic importance of international religious 
freedom policy within the State Department bureaucracy and show persecuted 
religious groups globally that the U.S. gives priority to the protection and 
promotion of international religious freedom.”215 Together with these telling 
omissions, the final Wolf Act likewise rejected clear statutory guarantees 
governing staffing and funding levels for OIRF and representational funds for 
the ambassador. 
The Senate also diluted the primary function of the newly minted 
Special Watch List by deleting the mandatory escalation to CPC status for 
countries remaining on the Watch List for two years. With this decision, it 
finished the job started by the House, which had already moved to delete the 
inclusion of NSAs on the list. As it stands, the new tier system under IRFA may 
give rise to a situation whereby a country falling just below the threshold of 
particularly severe violations of freedom religion remains on the Watch List 
without any imminent consequence or real impetus to engage diplomatically to 
resolve or mitigate violations.  
Still, viewed in its entirety, the Wolf Act does hold out some potential 
for at least a partial revival of IRFA’s mandate. First, IRFA now enables the 
designation of EPCs and—though not mandatory—formally opens the door 
to presidential measures targeting these violent nonstate actors. Second, the 
IRF ambassador is now empowered to report directly to the Secretary of 
State, creating at least one significant opening for advocacy and dialogue that 
potentially places religious freedom issues alongside other core foreign 
policy concerns. Cementing this, the ambassador is also newly designated as 
																																								 																				
215 Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act, H.R. 1150, 114th Cong. § 101 
(Office on International Religious Freedom; Ambassador for International Religious 
Freedom) (as engrossed in House, May 16, 2016). 
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“the” principal advisor to the Secretary of State on matters affecting religious 
freedom abroad. Third, the final amendments leave intact major provisions 
related to training State Department officials, a long-sought after objective of 
USCIRF and others.216 These new training requirements amend the Foreign 
Service Act to include mandatory “training on religious freedom for all 
Foreign Service officers, including all entry level officers.” They further 
empower the IRF Ambassador, in consultation with USCIRF, to make 
recommendations to the Secretary of State regarding the nature of the 
curriculum, including “how United States international religious freedom 
policy should be carried out in practice by United States diplomats and other 
Foreign Service officers.”217 If this training curriculum is substantive and 
executed effectively, it will address one of the longest-standing criticisms 
regarding implementation of IRFA. 
Similarly confirming the Congress’ readiness—if incrementally—to 
buttress the effectiveness of IRFA, the final law incorporates firm deadlines 
for presidential reporting and designating of CPCs. These new deadlines 
signal Congress’ intent to police IRFA’s operation more closely and close 
loopholes that previously had diminished the effectiveness of the reporting 
mechanism by tolerating periods of either late or altogether missed reporting 
and designation. Likewise, creation of a new tier system under IRFA through 
the Special Watch List furnishes the president with the ability to draw more 
nuanced distinctions among those states falling short of CPC status. 
Moreover, even though a state’s inclusion on the Watch List no longer comes 
with the built-in specter of looming sanction, if harnessed effectively, it may 
still serve to put states on notice and induce diplomatic engagement focused 
on improving religious freedom conditions.218  
Lastly, the Wolf Act operates to clarify and deepen IRFA’s 
understanding of freedom of religion and provide tools for more consistently 
keeping the spotlight on victims of religious freedom violations. With respect 
																																								 																				
216 As Hertzke concluded ten years ago, “efforts to strengthen the law seem warranted. 
Congress could mandate that a religious freedom specialist be appointed to the National 
Security Council. Congress could elevate the State Department Office and integrate its work 
with other diplomatic operations. Broader religious training for diplomatic personnel could 
be required.” Hertzke, supra note 57, at 22–23. 
217 Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act, Pub. L. No, 114-281, § 103, 130 
Stat. 1426 (2016) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6401). IRFA’s original amendments to the Foreign 
Service Act are general in nature, focusing on “instruction in the field of internationally 
recognized human rights.” International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-
292, §104, 112 Stat. 2787, 2790 (1998) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6413). 
218 See generally Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act, H.R. 1150, 114th 
Cong. (2015).   
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to the scope of freedom of religion, moving forward, IRFA now explicitly 
recognizes that the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion 
includes protection for the “non-theistic . . . .beliefs and the right not to 
profess or practice any religion.”219 It also identifies a “policy or practice of 
routinely denying applications for visas for religious workers” as indicative 
of a potentially “poor state of religious freedom” in a given country.220 
Finally, with respect to keeping a spotlight on victims of religious freedom 
violations and flagging violators, the Wolf Act introduced new, if imperfect, 
tools. Most notably, the Victims List, managed by USCIRF,221 and the 
Designated Persons List, managed by the State Department, hold new 
potential for naming and shaming as well as for deterring states from 
violating religious freedom norms from the outset. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The Wolf Act obtained the unopposed endorsement of the House and 
Senate as well as the approval of President Barak Obama. However, this 
moment of bipartisan buy-in came at the expense of casting off or 
downgrading several significant provisions contained in the bill’s original 
text. In the end, negotiations over the Wolf Act amendments to IRFA 
underscore the extent to which the United States’ promotion of international 
religious freedom remains a contested area. Despite assurances that the Act 
helps ensure “that defending religious freedom remains at the core of our 
engagement…and that we have the most effective policies in place to be 
successful,”222 the failure to adopt key reforms signals a continuing unease 
with fully integrating religious freedom promotion into U.S. foreign policy. 
 The ambivalent outcome hanging over the Wolf Act is encapsulated 
in how Congress opted to address the challenge of violent nonstate actors 
(NSAs). IRFA now includes a framework for identifying violent NSAs 
committing violations of religious freedom and enabling the president to 
designate those engaging in particularly severe violations as “Entities of 
Particular Concern” (EPC). However, while it may be tempting to draw a 
parallel between IRFA’s sanction-triggering “Country of Particular Concern” 
(CPC) designation and this new EPC designation, the similarity is superficial 
at best. As the legislative history assessed above demonstrates, in the quest 
																																								 																				
219 22 U.S.C. § 6401(a)(3) (2016). See also Human Rights Committee, supra note 191. 
220 22 U.S.C. § 6401(a)(4) (2016). 
221 22 U.S.C. § 6417(d)(1) (2016). 
222 Press Release, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Corker Praises Committee Passage of 
Religious Freedom Bill (Dec. 6, 2016), https://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/chair/release/cork 
er-praises-committee-passage-of-religious-freedom-bill [https://perma.cc/8FYX-B98W]. 
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to secure passage of the Wolf Act, Congressional negotiations stripped much 
of the substance intended to mirror the CPC regime from the new provisions 
applicable to nonstate actors. In place of a system that defines clear outcomes 
for EPCs, IRFA has been left with a framework riddled with ambiguities 
virtually guaranteeing uncertainty of outcome. Not only will it be difficult to 
consistently identify NSAs that qualify for scrutiny under IRFA, but the 
president will not be obligated to act against those designated as EPCs. 
 The same ambivalence is manifested elsewhere in the amendments. For 
example, the final Wolf Act made only incremental improvements to the status 
of the IRF Ambassador and the IRF Office, and stripped efforts to secure 
USCIRF’s extended reauthorization. These claw backs functioned to preserve 
executive discretion and reject other major changes intended to drive home the 
promotion of international religious freedom as a central component of U.S. 
foreign policy. At the same time, Congress did authorize mandatory religious 
freedom training for State Department officials. This training, if effectively 
designed and implemented, should have an overall impact on better integrating 
religious freedom concerns within the nation’s larger foreign policy enter-
prise.223 Likewise, new tools such as the Designated Persons List and Victims 
List will provide IRFA with new levers of engagement with recalcitrant states 
and nonstate actors alike. However, the Special Watch List system intended to 
put states and NSAs on notice—and backed by a tangible potential for CPC 
designation—ultimately fell appreciably short of the original vision set out in 
early 2015. Finally, while IRFA now includes the express recognition that 
freedom of religion includes protection for non-theistic and atheistic beliefs, it 
remains beset with unenforceable “sense of Congress” provisions. These provi-
sions arguably set the stage for potentially more muscular future action by 
Congress. However, the persistence of IRFA’s original “sense of” provisions and 
their continued non-enforcement dampens the likelihood of such an outcome. 
Whether these overdue amendments to IRFA will engender meaningful 
changes to the status quo will depend on a variety of elements. First, whether  
the newly appointed IRF ambassador can effectively assert the office’s new 
																																								 																				
223 An October 2018 report prepared by the State Department’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) 
found only “partial progress” in implementing the Wolf Act. INSPECTION OF THE BUREAU OF 
DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE 8 (2018), https://www.stateoig. 
gov/system/files/isp-i-19-11_1.pdf. OIG determined that while DRL “implemented key provi-
sions of the Act,” there were “deficiencies related to training, reporting structure, media support, 
and foreign assistance coordination.” Id. Specifically on training, it concluded the State Depart-
ment “was behind schedule in meeting requirements to develop international religious freedom 
training for all Foreign Service officers . . . During the inspection, the Office of International 
Religious Freedom prepared two of five proposed modules for an online course to fulfill this requi-
rement but had yet to complete the remaining three modules. Without these additional modules, 
the Foreign Service Institute was unable to conduct the training, as mandated by law.” Id. 
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responsibilities and profile; second, whether the new Secretary of State elects to 
vigorously implement the Wolf Act’s new powers, including the ability to sanc-
tion NSAs; and third, whether the president communicates a clear interest in 
vigorously promoting religious freedom as a foreign policy priority, including 
by prioritizing funding for international religious freedom promotion activities 
and instituting meaningful sanctions against designated CPCs and EPCs.  
Successfully effectuating change across these elements will hinge at 
least in part on the role played by human rights and religious freedom activists. 
In regard to this latter point, the Wolf Act provides several ready yardsticks 
that may prove useful for measuring the extent to which any of its changes are 
impacting the promotion of international religious freedom. Moving forward, 
scholars, activists and policymakers alike can turn their attention to assessing, 
for example: the scope and nature of funding afforded to international religious 
freedom activities; the extent of the IRF Ambassador’s inclusion in the policy-
making process; the timing and substance of CPC and EPC designation 
processes, including the types of action taken; the countries that are added to 
the Special Watch List, the nature of engagement that follows, and the duration 
of their designation as such; the content and execution of the State Depart-
ment’s religious freedom training curriculum; the timely and consistent release 
of the Designated Persons List; and the ongoing interaction between the State 
Department and USCIRF, including the status of the Commission’s future 
reauthorization. These metrics should serve as revealing bellwethers of where 
international religious freedom promotion is headed in a post-Wolf Act era. As 
such, they will also attest to whether the Wolf Act has truly served to 
“strengthen[] and modernize[]” IRFA “and promote and advance the universal 
human right of religious freedom around the world,”224 or whether another 
effort on the part of Congress will be required.225 
																																								 																				
224 Press Release, Marco Rubio, Rubio’s International Religious Freedom Bill Heads to 
President’s Desk (Dec. 13, 2016), https://www.rubio.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press-
releases?ID=629CFEBD-835E-4984-A188-DBF1E556E69D [https://perma.cc/UR3H-98NZ]. 
An earlier Rubio press release highlighted Wolf Act amendments to IRFA that the Senate 
ultimately scrapped, including the mandatory transfer of Special Watch List countries to CPC 
designation and a minimum staffing guarantee for the IRF Office. Press Release, Marco Rubio, 
Rubio Introduces Bill To Strengthen Promotion of International Religious Freedom (Apr. 28, 
2016), https://www.rubio.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press-releases?ID=648D5EF2-81EE-4 
E77-BC94-CDA8B3EAC16A [https://perma.cc/3SQ3-L2WK]. 
225 Already, some in Congress continue to pursue many of the proposed amendments lost 
during negotiations over the Wolf Act. One such proposed resolution reaffirms the 
commitment of the United States to promoting religious freedom, and calls on the president 
to “direct grants . . . towards civil society that are implementing innovated programs” aimed 
at promoting and safeguarding religious freedom and to “develop an action plan on 
international religious freedom and to integrate that plan into United States diplomatic, 
development, and national security strategies.” S. Res. 162, 115th Cong. (2017) (introduced). 
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